Single audit pass that removes pre-release back-compat, consolidates the
admin-policy decider, and fixes the .zddc write path.
Field removal — acl.allow / acl.deny:
- Drop ACLRules.Allow / Deny struct fields and mergeLegacyACL().
- Remove walker / lookups / validate / decider branches that read them.
- Migrate every test fixture (YAML strings and ACLRules struct literals)
to acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set }.
- Rewrite both bundled Rego policies (access.rego, access_federal.rego)
to traverse level.acl.permissions; rewrite parity-test helpers.
- Update create-project form (profile page) to collect permissions
instead of allow/deny lists.
Admin decider consolidation:
- Delete zddc.CanEditZddc — strict-ancestor rule retired. Subtree admins
own their own .zddc; the policy decider's IsActiveAdmin short-circuit
is the single bypass site.
- Migrate tablehandler.ServeTable to AllowActionFromChainP — closes the
same Forbidden bug already fixed for /browse.html.
- Drop AccessView.EditableParentChoices and treeEntry.CanEdit (always
true after the retirement). Profile page renders AdminSubtrees
directly for both lists.
- Drop the excludeLeaf parameter from AdminLevelInChain /
IsAdminForChain — no production caller passed true.
Dead code removed:
- policy.AllowWriteFromChain (zero production callers, zero tests).
- zddc.AllowedWithChain (zero production callers; tests deleted).
ModeStrict retirement — federal posture is OPA-only:
- Delete cascade_mode.go / cascade_mode_test.go and the ModeStrict
branches in cascade.go and acl.go.
- Drop --cascade-mode flag, CascadeMode config field, and the
InternalDecider.Mode field.
- Drop the mode parameter from every cascade helper:
GrantedVerbsAtLevel, AllowedAction, EffectiveVerbs,
EffectiveVerbsRange, RoleMembers, MatchesPrincipal,
MatchingPrincipals, WormZoneGrant, PolicyChain.VisibleStart.
- Strip cascade_mode from /.profile/config and
/.profile/effective-policy responses.
- Refresh README / ARCHITECTURE.md to describe federal posture as
"deploy OPA with access_federal.rego" (NIST AC-6); the bundled Rego
is the parent-deny-is-absolute variant. The in-process Go evaluator
implements only the commercial cascade.
Legacy redirects + .admin.css fallback:
- Drop /<dir>/.zddc.html → ?file=.zddc redirect and its test.
- Drop ?zip=1 retired comment + legacy test (handled by the
.zip virtual-URL path; covered by TestServeSubtreeZip).
- Drop .admin.css fallback in profile_assets.go — only .profile.css now.
- Refresh stale "retired" / "back-compat" / "legacy" comment markers.
.zddc write path fix:
- Dispatcher: route only GET/HEAD on .zddc URLs to ServeZddcFile; carve
.zddc out of the dot-prefix guard so PUT/DELETE/POST reach
ServeFileAPI. Before this, .zddc writes 405'd at ServeZddcFile and
the YAML editor's save flow had no live path.
- ServeFileAPI.resolveTargetPath: same .zddc-leaf carve-out so the file
API accepts the path; intermediate dot dirs (.zddc.d/) stay reserved.
- Listing: compute Writable per-file with ActionAdmin for .zddc
(matches the file API's gate) instead of ActionWrite for everything.
- Virtual .zddc placeholder: compute Writable via the same
parentActiveAdmin || ActionAdmin path. Was always false before.
- browse YAML editor canSave: exempt virtual .zddc — the synthetic
body is designed to materialize on PUT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package zddc
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// WORM (write-once-read-many) zones are declared in the cascade via
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// the `worm:` key on a ZddcFile (see file.go). This file resolves the
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// effective WORM grant for a principal walking a policy chain.
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//
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// Replaces the hardcoded IsWormPath / WormFolderLevelIndex / WormMask
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// machinery (which keyed off the literal folder names "received" and
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// "issued"). The convention now lives in defaults.zddc.yaml — those
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// two folders carry `worm: {}` — and any operator can mark another
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// directory WORM by adding `worm:` to its .zddc.
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// WormZoneGrant inspects the policy chain for email. If any level in
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// the chain (including paths-derived contributions) declares a `worm:`
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// map, the path is inside a WORM zone: inWorm is true and grant is the
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// UNION of the principal's verb grants across every Worm map in the
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// chain, masked to {r, c}. When no level declares worm:, inWorm is
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// false and grant is meaningless (returned as 0).
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//
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// Caller (the policy evaluator) combines this with the normal cascade
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// read grant:
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//
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// if g, inWorm := WormZoneGrant(chain, email, mode); inWorm {
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// effective = (normalCascadeVerbs(chain, email, mode) & VerbR) |
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// (g & VerbsRC)
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// return effective.Has(requestedVerb)
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// }
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//
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// i.e. inside a WORM zone, w/d/a are always stripped; c survives only
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// via the worm: grant; r survives via the normal ACL or the worm:
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// grant. Admins are excluded upstream (handler's IsAdmin bypass).
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func WormZoneGrant(chain PolicyChain, email string) (grant VerbSet, inWorm bool) {
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for i := 0; i < len(chain.Levels); i++ {
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wl := chain.Levels[i].Worm
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if wl == nil {
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continue
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}
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inWorm = true
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for _, principal := range wl {
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if MatchesPrincipal(principal, email, chain, i) {
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grant |= VerbsRC // listed controllers get read + write-once-create
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}
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}
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}
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// The embedded baseline could in principle carry a top-level
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// worm: too (it doesn't today — it's declared via paths:), so
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// fold it in for completeness.
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if chain.Embedded.Worm != nil {
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inWorm = true
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for _, principal := range chain.Embedded.Worm {
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if MatchesPattern(principal, email) {
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grant |= VerbsRC
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}
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}
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}
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if !inWorm {
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return 0, false
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}
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return grant, true
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}
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