ZDDC/zddc/internal/handler/auth_invariants_test.go

package handler

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"net/url"
	"os"
	"path/filepath"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"codeberg.org/VARASYS/ZDDC/zddc/internal/config"
	"codeberg.org/VARASYS/ZDDC/zddc/internal/zddc"
)

// auth_invariants_test.go — behavioral lock-in for the admin/elevation/
// WORM invariants. These tests must pass against the CURRENT code before
// the consolidation refactor (single bypass site in InternalDecider) so
// the refactor can be validated against a green baseline.
//
// Each test covers one invariant called out in the security audit. The
// names are deliberately verbose — when one fails, the failure message
// alone tells you which property got broken.

// invariantsFixture sets up a synthetic ZDDC root with:
//
//   - admin@example.com  — root super-admin
//   - alice@example.com  — subtree admin of Project-1/working (via per-dir
//                          .zddc admins:) — used to test subtree scope
//   - bob@example.com    — document_controller role member (gets WORM cr
//                          on received/ + issued/ via cascade defaults)
//   - eve@example.com    — non-admin, project_team only (read-only across
//                          the project per defaults)
//
// Plus one file each in working/, issued/, received/ so we can exercise
// reads + writes across the cascade.
func invariantsFixture(t *testing.T) (config.Config, string) {
	t.Helper()
	root := t.TempDir()

	mustWriteHelper(t, filepath.Join(root, ".zddc"),
		"admins:\n  - admin@example.com\n"+
			"roles:\n"+
			"  document_controller:\n    members: [bob@example.com]\n"+
			"  project_team:\n    members: [\"*@example.com\"]\n")

	for _, d := range []string{
		"Project-1/working/eve@example.com",
		"Project-1/archive/Acme/received/Acme-0042",
		"Project-1/archive/Acme/issued/2026-05-15_Acme-0099 (IFR) - Test",
	} {
		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, d), 0o755); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("mkdir %s: %v", d, err)
		}
	}

	// Subtree-admin grant: alice administers Project-1/working/.
	mustWriteHelper(t,
		filepath.Join(root, "Project-1/working/.zddc"),
		"admins:\n  - alice@example.com\n")

	// Files to act on.
	mustWriteHelper(t,
		filepath.Join(root, "Project-1/working/eve@example.com/draft.md"),
		"# eve's draft\n")
	mustWriteHelper(t,
		filepath.Join(root, "Project-1/archive/Acme/received/Acme-0042/Acme-0042_A (RFI) - Test.pdf"),
		"%PDF-A\n")
	mustWriteHelper(t,
		filepath.Join(root, "Project-1/archive/Acme/issued/2026-05-15_Acme-0099 (IFR) - Test/Acme-0099_0A (IFR) - Test.md"),
		"# issued draft\n")
	zddc.InvalidateCache(root)

	return config.Config{
		Root:          root,
		EmailHeader:   "X-Auth-Request-Email",
		MaxWriteBytes: 64 * 1024,
	}, root
}

// do executes a request with the given email / elevation flag. URL-encoding
// is computed from the path so spaces and parens (real ZDDC filenames)
// round-trip cleanly.
func doReq(cfg config.Config, method, urlPath, email string, elevated bool, body []byte, op string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
	u := &url.URL{Path: urlPath}
	req := httptest.NewRequest(method, u.RequestURI(), bytes.NewReader(body))
	if op != "" {
		req.Header.Set(headerOp, op)
	}
	ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), EmailKey, email)
	ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ElevatedKey, elevated)
	req = req.WithContext(ctx)
	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
	ServeFileAPI(cfg, rec, req)
	return rec
}

// ── Invariant 1 — Un-elevated admin has no admin authority ────────────────

func TestInvariant_UnelevatedAdminCannotBypassWorm(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/issued/2026-05-15_Acme-0099 (IFR) - Test/Acme-0099_0A (IFR) - Test.md"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "admin@example.com", false, []byte("# mutated\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("un-elevated admin write succeeded: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

func TestInvariant_UnelevatedAdminCannotEditZddc(t *testing.T) {
	// The .zddc edit authority lives in zddc.CanEditZddc, gated on
	// Principal.gate() — un-elevated must return false even for a root
	// super-admin. Exercised at the helper boundary; the HTTP path
	// guards .zddc at resolveTargetPath separately.
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	p := zddc.Principal{Email: "admin@example.com", Elevated: false}
	dir := filepath.Join(cfg.Root, "Project-1/working")
	if zddc.CanEditZddc(cfg.Root, dir, p) {
		t.Fatalf("un-elevated admin can edit .zddc — gate() bypassed")
	}
}

// ── Invariant 2 — Elevated admin can do everything (positive control) ─────

func TestInvariant_ElevatedAdminBypassesWorm(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/issued/2026-05-15_Acme-0099 (IFR) - Test/Acme-0099_0A (IFR) - Test.md"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "admin@example.com", true, []byte("# fix-mis-filed\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK && rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
		t.Fatalf("elevated admin write blocked: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

// ── Invariant 3 — Subtree admin scope ──────────────────────────────────────

func TestInvariant_ElevatedSubtreeAdminWritesInScope(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	target := "/Project-1/working/eve@example.com/draft.md"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "alice@example.com", true, []byte("# alice override\n"), "")
	// alice is subtree admin of Project-1/working/ — should override eve's
	// fenced auto-own and write through.
	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK && rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
		t.Fatalf("elevated subtree admin write in scope blocked: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

func TestInvariant_ElevatedSubtreeAdminBlockedOutsideScope(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	// alice is subtree admin of /Project-1/working/, NOT of /Project-1/archive/.
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/issued/2026-05-15_Acme-0099 (IFR) - Test/Acme-0099_0A (IFR) - Test.md"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "alice@example.com", true, []byte("# out-of-scope\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("subtree admin escaped scope: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

// ── Invariant 4 — .zddc strict-ancestor self-elevation prevention ─────────

// Strict-ancestor was retired — a subtree admin owns their .zddc.
// These tests pin the post-change contract: an elevated admin
// granted in /<dir>/.zddc CAN edit that file (add collaborators,
// adjust ACLs, even — accidentally — remove themselves). Footgun
// is recoverable via super-admin restore.

func TestInvariant_SubtreeAdminCanEditOwnSubtreeZddc(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	p := zddc.Principal{Email: "alice@example.com", Elevated: true}
	dir := filepath.Join(cfg.Root, "Project-1/working")
	chain, err := zddc.EffectivePolicy(cfg.Root, dir)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("EffectivePolicy: %v", err)
	}
	if !zddc.IsAdminForChain(chain, p.Email, false) {
		t.Fatalf("subtree admin lost authority to edit own .zddc — strict-ancestor wasn't supposed to apply")
	}
}

func TestInvariant_SubtreeAdminCanEditDeeperZddc(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	p := zddc.Principal{Email: "alice@example.com", Elevated: true}
	dir := filepath.Join(cfg.Root, "Project-1/working/eve@example.com")
	chain, err := zddc.EffectivePolicy(cfg.Root, dir)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("EffectivePolicy: %v", err)
	}
	if !zddc.IsAdminForChain(chain, p.Email, false) {
		t.Fatalf("subtree admin blocked from editing deeper .zddc")
	}
}

// ── Invariant 5 — Empty email never matches ────────────────────────────────

func TestInvariant_EmptyEmailHasNoAuthority(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	target := "/Project-1/working/eve@example.com/draft.md"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "", true, []byte("# anon\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden && rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
		t.Fatalf("empty-email write succeeded: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

// ── Invariant 6 — WORM cr survives for document_controller (no admin) ─────

func TestInvariant_DocControllerCanCreateInWormZone(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	// bob is a document_controller (per role membership) but NOT an admin.
	// He must be able to CREATE new files in received/<tracking>/ even
	// without elevation — the WORM cr grant carries.
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/received/Acme-0042/Acme-0042_B (RFI) - Followup.pdf"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "bob@example.com", false, []byte("%PDF-B\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK && rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
		t.Fatalf("doc_controller blocked from WORM create: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

func TestInvariant_DocControllerCannotOverwriteInWormZone(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	// bob can CREATE in WORM but cannot OVERWRITE — the worm strip
	// removes w/d for everyone, even WORM-listed principals.
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/received/Acme-0042/Acme-0042_A (RFI) - Test.pdf"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "bob@example.com", false, []byte("%PDF-mutated\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("doc_controller bypassed WORM overwrite-strip: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

// ── Invariant 7 — project_team has read but no write ──────────────────────

func TestInvariant_ProjectTeamCanReadCannotWrite(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	// eve is project_team (r at project level) and the file lives under
	// her own working/ home — but she is NOT in any admin list and not
	// elevated, so writes must be ACL-gated.
	//
	// In her own home, eve has auto-own rwcda via the working/<email>/
	// auto-own pattern; the cascade gives her create+write there. So
	// the right test is a write OUTSIDE her home — into a peer's area
	// or into archive.
	target := "/Project-1/archive/Acme/received/Acme-0042/Acme-0042_A (RFI) - Test.pdf"
	rec := doReq(cfg, http.MethodPut, target, "eve@example.com", false, []byte("# eve overwrite\n"), "")
	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("project_team escaped WORM strip: status=%d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
	}
}

// ── Invariant 8 — Forward-auth endpoint requires admin membership ─────────

func TestInvariant_ForwardAuthEndpointGatesOnAdminsList(t *testing.T) {
	cfg, _ := invariantsFixture(t)
	for _, tc := range []struct {
		email string
		want  int
		why   string
	}{
		{"admin@example.com", http.StatusOK, "root admin"},
		{"alice@example.com", http.StatusForbidden, "subtree admin only — /.auth/admin gates on ROOT admins:, not subtree"},
		{"eve@example.com", http.StatusForbidden, "non-admin"},
		{"", http.StatusForbidden, "anonymous"},
	} {
		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.auth/admin", nil)
		ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), EmailKey, tc.email)
		req = req.WithContext(ctx)
		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
		ServeAuthAdmin(cfg, rec, req)
		if rec.Code != tc.want {
			t.Errorf("/.auth/admin for %q (%s): got %d, want %d",
				tc.email, tc.why, rec.Code, tc.want)
		}
	}
}

// ── Invariant 9 — Profile admin endpoints 404 (not 403) for non-admins ────

func TestInvariant_ProfileAdminEndpointsHideFromNonAdmins(t *testing.T) {
	// These checks lock in the existence-hiding property: non-admins must
	// see 404, never 403, so they can't probe which paths exist.
	t.Skip("requires the profile handler dispatcher entry point; skip until the refactor confirms ServeProfile signature")
}

// dump prints the rec body when t.Logf would help debugging — used in
// failure messages to avoid silently empty 403 cases.
func dumpBody(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
	s := rec.Body.String()
	return strings.TrimSpace(s)
}