ZDDC/zddc/internal/handler/middleware.go
ZDDC 3115e388fc feat(server): authenticated CRUD + verb-based RBAC with WORM archive folders
Replaces the binary acl.allow/deny model with five permission verbs
(r/w/c/d/a) and first-class roles, and adds an authenticated file API
(PUT/DELETE/POST move/mkdir) so the HTML tools can edit-in-place over
HTTP. Closes the AC-3(7) and AC-6 federal-readiness gaps.

File API (zddc/internal/handler/fileapi.go)
  - PUT <new>      → action c
  - PUT <existing> → action w
  - PUT <.zddc>    → action a (CanEditZddc strict-ancestor rule)
  - DELETE         → action d
  - POST mkdir     → action c (auto-writes creator-owned .zddc when the
                     parent is Incoming/Working/Staging)
  - POST move      → action w on src + c on dst, atomic via os.Rename
  - Optional If-Match for optimistic concurrency, --max-write-bytes cap,
    audit log emits a structured file_write event per operation.

Permission model (zddc/internal/zddc/{acl,file,roles,cascade_mode}.go)
  - acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set } map; principals are email
    patterns or role names. Empty verb set is an explicit deny.
  - roles: { name → members } definitions, available at the level they
    declare and all descendants. Closer-to-leaf shadows ancestor.
  - Legacy acl.allow/deny still work; they fold into permissions at
    parse time (allow → "rwcd", deny → "").
  - Cascade walks leaf→root; first level with any matching entry wins;
    the union of matching verb sets at that level decides.
  - --cascade-mode=strict adds a root→leaf ancestor-deny pre-pass so an
    ancestor explicit-deny is absolute (NIST AC-6). Default delegated
    preserves the existing commercial behavior.

Special folders (zddc/internal/zddc/special.go)
  - Incoming / Working / Staging: mkdir auto-writes a .zddc into the new
    subdir granting created_by + that email rwcda directly. Same form
    operators write by hand; creator can edit it later to add others.
  - Issued / Received: server-enforced WORM split. Cascade grants
    inherited from above the WORM folder are masked to r only; grants
    placed at-or-below the WORM folder retain r,c. Operators grant
    write-once (cr) to the doc controller via an explicit .zddc at the
    Issued/Received folder. Admins exempt — only escape hatch.

Browser polyfill (shared/zddc-source.js)
  - HttpDirectoryHandle + HttpFileHandle implement the FS Access API
    surface (values, getFileHandle, createWritable, removeEntry,
    queryPermission/requestPermission) over zddc-server's listing JSON
    and file API. Existing tools written against showDirectoryPicker
    work unchanged.
  - detectServerRoot() returns { handle, status }: tools auto-load on
    HTTP, surface a clear "no permission to list" message on 403, and
    fall back to the welcome screen on 0.
  - classifier renames take the atomic POST move path on HTTP-backed
    handles; mdedit and transmittal route reads/writes through the
    polyfill so prior FS-API code paths cover both modes.

Tests
  - zddc/internal/zddc/{cascade_mode,roles,special,acl}_test.go cover
    delegated vs strict, role membership / shadowing / legacy fallback,
    WORM split semantics, verb-set parser round-trip.
  - zddc/internal/handler/fileapi_test.go now also covers role-based
    vendor scenarios, WORM blocking vendor & doc controller writes,
    explicit Issued .zddc unlocking the cr drop-box, admin bypass,
    auto-ownership on mkdir, and strict-mode lockouts.

Docs
  - ARCHITECTURE.md + zddc/README.md document the verb model, role
    syntax, special-folder behaviors, cascade-mode flag, and full file
    API surface. Federal-readiness gap analysis strikes AC-3(7) and
    AC-6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 15:58:04 -05:00

172 lines
6 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"time"
"codeberg.org/VARASYS/ZDDC/zddc/internal/config"
"codeberg.org/VARASYS/ZDDC/zddc/internal/policy"
"log/slog"
)
type contextKey string
// EmailKey is the context key for the authenticated user's email.
const EmailKey contextKey = "email"
// DeciderKey is the context key for the request's policy decider.
// Set by ACLMiddleware so handlers deep in the stack can issue policy
// queries without taking the decider as an explicit parameter. Although
// the decider is an app-wide singleton (not per-request state), routing
// it through context keeps the call-site signatures stable across the
// "swap internal evaluator for external OPA" plumbing change.
const DeciderKey contextKey = "policy-decider"
// ACLMiddleware extracts the user email from the configured header and stores
// it (along with the policy decider) in the request context. It does NOT
// enforce ACL itself — each handler performs its own ACL check via
// policy.AllowFromChain.
func ACLMiddleware(cfg config.Config, decider policy.Decider, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
email := r.Header.Get(cfg.EmailHeader)
// DEBUG-level header dump for diagnosing proxy / SSO header
// passthrough. Off by default (LogLevel info); enable with
// ZDDC_LOG_LEVEL=debug. Logs the configured header name, the
// observed value at that name, and the full request header
// map so an operator can see exactly what reached the binary.
// Note: at debug level this also captures auth tokens, cookies,
// and anything else upstream proxies forward — only enable in
// trusted environments.
slog.Debug("request headers",
"configured", cfg.EmailHeader,
"observed", email,
"headers", r.Header)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), EmailKey, email)
if decider != nil {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, DeciderKey, decider)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// EmailFromContext extracts the user email from the request context.
func EmailFromContext(r *http.Request) string {
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(EmailKey).(string); ok {
return v
}
return ""
}
// WithEmail returns a context carrying email under EmailKey. Test seam
// for handlers that look up the authenticated user via EmailFromContext;
// production traffic gets the same value injected by ACLMiddleware.
func WithEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, EmailKey, email)
}
// DeciderFromContext extracts the policy decider from the request
// context. Returns the internal decider as a fallback if none was
// installed — this matches the "no OPA configured" semantics and
// keeps test setups that don't install ACLMiddleware functional.
func DeciderFromContext(r *http.Request) policy.Decider {
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(DeciderKey).(policy.Decider); ok {
return v
}
return &policy.InternalDecider{}
}
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture status code and bytes written.
type responseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
status int
bytes int
wrote bool
}
// WriteHeader records the status code and writes it to the underlying ResponseWriter.
func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rw.status = code
rw.wrote = true
rw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// Write records the bytes written and writes to the underlying ResponseWriter.
func (rw *responseWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := rw.ResponseWriter.Write(b)
rw.bytes += n
return n, err
}
// HSTSMiddleware sets the Strict-Transport-Security response header,
// instructing browsers to refuse plain-HTTP connections to this host
// for the next year (NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2 § 4.4.6, also DoD STIG
// expectation; OWASP recommendation max-age >= 1 year). Use ONLY when
// zddc-server is itself terminating TLS — when an upstream proxy
// terminates, that proxy should set HSTS instead.
//
// includeSubDomains is set; preload is not (preload requires
// pre-submitting the domain to the browser-vendor list — out of
// scope for this server, and operators who want it can override
// upstream).
//
// max-age = 31536000 = 365 days.
func HSTSMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// AccessLogMiddleware logs a structured line per HTTP request after the
// response is written.
//
// Always emits to slog.Default() (stderr) so server-lifecycle logs and
// access logs share an output stream by default.
//
// If `auditLogger` is non-nil, the same structured fields are also written
// to it. The intended caller wires up auditLogger with a JSON handler
// pointing at a rotating file (see cmd/zddc-server's setupAccessAuditLog),
// so an operator gets a persisted audit trail on disk in addition to the
// stderr stream — useful when stderr is not journald-captured (e.g.
// container logging where the orchestrator drops stderr after restarts).
func AccessLogMiddleware(auditLogger *slog.Logger, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Capture request start time
start := time.Now()
// Wrap the ResponseWriter
wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, status: 200}
// Serve the request
next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
// Calculate duration
durationMs := int(time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
// Get email from context
email := EmailFromContext(r)
if email == "" {
email = "anonymous"
}
args := []any{
"ts", start.Format(time.RFC3339),
"email", email,
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"status", wrapped.status,
"bytes", wrapped.bytes,
"duration_ms", durationMs,
}
// Stderr stream (existing behavior).
slog.Info("access", args...)
// Audit file (when configured). Same fields, separate handler so
// the file can be JSON-formatted regardless of stderr's handler.
if auditLogger != nil {
auditLogger.Info("access", args...)
}
})
}