Replaces the binary acl.allow/deny model with five permission verbs
(r/w/c/d/a) and first-class roles, and adds an authenticated file API
(PUT/DELETE/POST move/mkdir) so the HTML tools can edit-in-place over
HTTP. Closes the AC-3(7) and AC-6 federal-readiness gaps.
File API (zddc/internal/handler/fileapi.go)
- PUT <new> → action c
- PUT <existing> → action w
- PUT <.zddc> → action a (CanEditZddc strict-ancestor rule)
- DELETE → action d
- POST mkdir → action c (auto-writes creator-owned .zddc when the
parent is Incoming/Working/Staging)
- POST move → action w on src + c on dst, atomic via os.Rename
- Optional If-Match for optimistic concurrency, --max-write-bytes cap,
audit log emits a structured file_write event per operation.
Permission model (zddc/internal/zddc/{acl,file,roles,cascade_mode}.go)
- acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set } map; principals are email
patterns or role names. Empty verb set is an explicit deny.
- roles: { name → members } definitions, available at the level they
declare and all descendants. Closer-to-leaf shadows ancestor.
- Legacy acl.allow/deny still work; they fold into permissions at
parse time (allow → "rwcd", deny → "").
- Cascade walks leaf→root; first level with any matching entry wins;
the union of matching verb sets at that level decides.
- --cascade-mode=strict adds a root→leaf ancestor-deny pre-pass so an
ancestor explicit-deny is absolute (NIST AC-6). Default delegated
preserves the existing commercial behavior.
Special folders (zddc/internal/zddc/special.go)
- Incoming / Working / Staging: mkdir auto-writes a .zddc into the new
subdir granting created_by + that email rwcda directly. Same form
operators write by hand; creator can edit it later to add others.
- Issued / Received: server-enforced WORM split. Cascade grants
inherited from above the WORM folder are masked to r only; grants
placed at-or-below the WORM folder retain r,c. Operators grant
write-once (cr) to the doc controller via an explicit .zddc at the
Issued/Received folder. Admins exempt — only escape hatch.
Browser polyfill (shared/zddc-source.js)
- HttpDirectoryHandle + HttpFileHandle implement the FS Access API
surface (values, getFileHandle, createWritable, removeEntry,
queryPermission/requestPermission) over zddc-server's listing JSON
and file API. Existing tools written against showDirectoryPicker
work unchanged.
- detectServerRoot() returns { handle, status }: tools auto-load on
HTTP, surface a clear "no permission to list" message on 403, and
fall back to the welcome screen on 0.
- classifier renames take the atomic POST move path on HTTP-backed
handles; mdedit and transmittal route reads/writes through the
polyfill so prior FS-API code paths cover both modes.
Tests
- zddc/internal/zddc/{cascade_mode,roles,special,acl}_test.go cover
delegated vs strict, role membership / shadowing / legacy fallback,
WORM split semantics, verb-set parser round-trip.
- zddc/internal/handler/fileapi_test.go now also covers role-based
vendor scenarios, WORM blocking vendor & doc controller writes,
explicit Issued .zddc unlocking the cr drop-box, admin bypass,
auto-ownership on mkdir, and strict-mode lockouts.
Docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md + zddc/README.md document the verb model, role
syntax, special-folder behaviors, cascade-mode flag, and full file
API surface. Federal-readiness gap analysis strikes AC-3(7) and
AC-6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package zddc
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import "testing"
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// helpers
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func chain(levels ...ZddcFile) PolicyChain {
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return PolicyChain{Levels: levels, HasAnyFile: len(levels) > 0}
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}
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func perms(p map[string]string) ZddcFile {
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return ZddcFile{ACL: ACLRules{Permissions: p}}
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}
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// TestDelegated_LeafGrantOverridesAncestorDeny verifies the historical
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// commercial behavior preserved as ModeDelegated.
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func TestDelegated_LeafGrantOverridesAncestorDeny(t *testing.T) {
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c := chain(
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perms(map[string]string{"vendor_acme": ""}), // root: deny
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ZddcFile{ // mid: define the role
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ACL: ACLRules{},
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Roles: map[string]Role{"vendor_acme": {Members: []string{"*@acme.com"}}},
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},
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perms(map[string]string{"vendor_acme": "rwcd"}), // leaf: allow
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)
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// Need the role definition to flow up to root for the deny entry to
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// match acme members. Add the role at root too.
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c.Levels[0].Roles = map[string]Role{"vendor_acme": {Members: []string{"*@acme.com"}}}
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if !AllowedAction(c, "rep@acme.com", VerbR, ModeDelegated) {
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t.Errorf("delegated mode: leaf rwcd should override root deny for read")
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}
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if !AllowedAction(c, "rep@acme.com", VerbW, ModeDelegated) {
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t.Errorf("delegated mode: leaf rwcd should override root deny for write")
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}
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}
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func TestStrict_AncestorDenyAbsolute(t *testing.T) {
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c := chain(
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ZddcFile{
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ACL: ACLRules{Permissions: map[string]string{"vendor_acme": ""}},
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Roles: map[string]Role{"vendor_acme": {Members: []string{"*@acme.com"}}},
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},
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ZddcFile{
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ACL: ACLRules{Permissions: map[string]string{"vendor_acme": "rwcd"}},
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},
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)
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if AllowedAction(c, "rep@acme.com", VerbR, ModeStrict) {
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t.Errorf("strict mode: root deny should not be overridable by leaf grant")
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}
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if AllowedAction(c, "rep@acme.com", VerbW, ModeStrict) {
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t.Errorf("strict mode: root deny should not be overridable by leaf grant (write)")
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}
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}
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func TestStrict_NoAncestorDenyMeansLeafDecides(t *testing.T) {
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c := chain(
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ZddcFile{
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ACL: ACLRules{Permissions: map[string]string{"_company": "r"}},
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Roles: map[string]Role{"_company": {Members: []string{"*@mycompany.com"}}},
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},
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perms(map[string]string{"alice@mycompany.com": "rwcd"}),
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)
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if !AllowedAction(c, "alice@mycompany.com", VerbW, ModeStrict) {
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t.Errorf("strict: leaf grant should decide when no ancestor explicit-deny matches")
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}
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}
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func TestStrict_AncestorDenyOnRoleSpecificEntryDoesNotBlockOthers(t *testing.T) {
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// Root denies vendor_acme but grants _company. acme is locked out
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// under strict; mycompany staff still see leaf grants.
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c := chain(
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ZddcFile{
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ACL: ACLRules{Permissions: map[string]string{
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"vendor_acme": "",
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"_company": "r",
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}},
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Roles: map[string]Role{
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"vendor_acme": {Members: []string{"*@acme.com"}},
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"_company": {Members: []string{"*@mycompany.com"}},
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},
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},
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perms(map[string]string{"_company": "rwcd"}),
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)
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if AllowedAction(c, "rep@acme.com", VerbR, ModeStrict) {
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t.Errorf("strict: acme should be denied (root deny is absolute)")
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}
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if !AllowedAction(c, "alice@mycompany.com", VerbW, ModeStrict) {
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t.Errorf("strict: mycompany's leaf grant should still apply (no matching ancestor deny)")
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}
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}
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func TestParseCascadeMode(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string]CascadeMode{
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"": ModeDelegated,
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"delegated": ModeDelegated,
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"strict": ModeStrict,
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}
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for in, want := range cases {
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got, ok := ParseCascadeMode(in)
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if !ok || got != want {
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t.Errorf("ParseCascadeMode(%q) = %v %v, want %v true", in, got, ok, want)
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}
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}
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if _, ok := ParseCascadeMode("loose"); ok {
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t.Errorf("ParseCascadeMode(\"loose\") should be ok=false")
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}
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}
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