The rule said: an admin granted in /<dir>/.zddc can edit deeper
.zddc files but NOT the one that grants their own authority.
Intended to prevent self-elevation, peer-addition, and delegator-
removal.
Three problems:
- "Add peers" isn't an attack — it's the common collaboration case.
Project creator can't grant a teammate access without bothering a
super-admin every time.
- "Remove the delegator" doesn't work. Root admin authority lives
in the ROOT .zddc and cascades down regardless of what's in
/<dir>/.zddc; subtree admins can't touch it.
- "Self-elevation" within a subtree is meaningless. They already
have rwcda there.
Replacement model: admins in /<dir>/.zddc OWN /<dir>/ and everything
beneath, including the .zddc itself. They can add collaborators,
modify ACLs, even remove themselves. Self-removal is a recoverable
footgun — root super-admins always retain authority via the root
cascade and can restore.
What stays:
- The admins: field as a load-bearing key (drives IsActiveAdmin
+ sudo-style elevation + WORM bypass).
- Bootstrap via root .zddc hand-editing.
- IsAdminForChain(chain, email, excludeLeaf bool) signature —
ModeStrict / NIST AC-6 deployments can still opt into the strict-
ancestor walk if they need it.
Tests flipped to match the new contract; ProjectCreate flow now
gives the creator real control over their project root.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Baseline test battery that pins the current auth-decision behavior so
the upcoming consolidation refactor (single bypass site in
InternalDecider.Allow) is validated against a green baseline.
Each test names one invariant; failure messages identify exactly
which property regressed. Coverage:
- Un-elevated admin cannot bypass WORM (PUT to issued/ → 403).
- Un-elevated admin cannot edit .zddc (Principal.gate() blocks).
- Elevated admin bypasses WORM (positive control).
- Elevated subtree admin writes within scope, blocked outside it.
- Strict-ancestor rule: subtree admin cannot edit own subtree's
.zddc, can edit deeper .zddc.
- Empty email never matches.
- WORM cr survives for un-elevated document_controller (create OK,
overwrite still stripped).
- project_team has read-only outside their auto-own home.
- Forward-auth /.auth/admin gates strictly on ROOT admins:.
wormbypass_test.go retained as the original repro of the live bitnest
observation (un-elevated user write succeeded under --no-auth=1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
