27 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 97ffaac13b |
feat(server): self-issued bearer tokens + --no-auth flag
zddc-server now issues its own bearer tokens for non-browser callers (CLI tools, scripts, downstream proxy/cache/mirror instances). No external IDP, no JWKS rotation. Self-service flow: sign in via the browser, visit /.tokens, click "Create token," paste the resulting plaintext into a 0600 file, and pass --bearer-file <path> to whatever calls back into the server. Storage is <ZDDC_ROOT>/.zddc.d/tokens/<sha256-hex>, YAML per token with email/created/expires/description. Filename is the *hash* of the plaintext, never the plaintext itself — a leak of the tokens directory exposes hashes, not credentials. Mode 0600 / 0700, atomic writes via temp+rename. Already shielded from public serving by the existing dot-prefix guards in dispatch and fs.ListDirectory. ACLMiddleware now recognises Authorization: Bearer <token>. On valid token, sets the request email from the token file and falls through to the existing ACL chain. On any failure (unknown / expired / store unavailable / Bearer with no validator), returns 401 — no silent fallback to anonymous, so a misconfigured client fails loudly. JSON API at /.api/tokens (GET list, POST create, DELETE /<id> revoke) backs a small inline HTML self-service page at /.tokens. Users can only see and revoke their own tokens; cross-user revoke returns 404 to avoid leaking ownership. --no-auth (ZDDC_NO_AUTH=1) skips ACL enforcement entirely on this instance. On master: anyone reads everything (dev / trusted-LAN / public-read deployments). On a downstream proxy/cache/mirror: trust upstream's filtering, don't re-evaluate ACLs locally. Implemented as a swap to policy.AllowAllDecider; all existing handlers keep calling AllowFromChain unchanged. Distinct from --insecure, which only relaxes the no-root-.zddc startup check. WARN-level startup log when --no-auth is active so accidental enablement is visible. 33 new tests covering token storage, validation/expiry/revocation, the JSON API end-to-end, the HTML page, and the middleware-Bearer integration including the case-insensitive prefix and expired-token paths. Full suite + go vet clean. Doc updates: zddc/README.md "Authentication" rewritten to cover both auth paths and the token UI/API; AGENTS.md gains ZDDC_NO_AUTH and a "Bearer tokens" subsection flagging the dot-prefix-shielding pre- condition; ARCHITECTURE.md adds "Bearer token issuance" and "--no-auth" subsections under "Server security model" with the hash-as-filename rationale and dispatch-shielding regression- sensitivity called out; CLAUDE.md adds a one-line summary of the new auth topology so future agents pick it up by default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 0ad47561ed |
feat(server): redirect rows-dir URLs to canonical .table.html
When an HTML GET hits a directory that's the rows-dir of a registered
table — i.e. parent declares `tables: { <name>: ... }` with a valid
spec, OR the default-MDL fallback applies at archive/<party>/mdl/ —
ServeDirectory now 302s to <parent>/<name>.table.html so users land
on the table view instead of a bare browse listing of the row-yaml
files. JSON GETs on the same URL fall through unchanged so the table
client can still enumerate row files.
Detection reuses RecognizeTableRequest: synthesize the equivalent
.table.html URL from the directory request and let the existing
recognizer apply its operator-vs-default-vs-missing-spec rules. No
duplicated validation.
Updates main_test.go's TestDispatchSlashRouting to expect the new
behavior on archive/<party>/mdl/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 41dff23127 |
feat(handler): per-directory <dir>/.zddc.html editor URL
Add a virtual-URL alias so the existing form-based .zddc editor is reachable at the natural directory location (<dir>/.zddc.html) in addition to the legacy /.profile/zddc/edit?path=<dir> entry. Both flow through the same renderZddcEditor body — same template, same gate, same form-posts-to-/.profile/zddc semantics. Wiring: - IsZddcEditorRequest(urlPath) reports whether the URL ends with the .zddc.html leaf (case-fold not needed; .zddc is itself case- sensitive on disk). - ServeZddcEditorAtPath strips the leaf, resolves the parent dir, asserts the dir exists, gates on hasAnyAdminScope, calls the shared renderer. - The dispatcher routes IsZddcEditorRequest URLs BEFORE the dot- prefix segment guard (which would otherwise 404 the .zddc.html leaf). The route is method-gated GET-only; mutations still go through PUT/POST/DELETE on <dir>/.zddc via the file API. Permission model unchanged from the /.profile entry: hasAnyAdminScope gates visibility of the editor itself; CanEditZddc decides whether the form is interactive or read-only at the requested directory. Subtree admins can still inspect ancestor cascade ACLs (intended since the cascade is what determines their authority). Test (TestDispatchZddcEditorAtPath): root admin opens project / working/ / deployment-root editors; non-admin and anonymous both 404; missing directory 404; trailing-segment-after-leaf 404. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| f7958d7b22 |
feat(dispatch): trailing slash → browse, no slash → canonical default tool
URL convention for directories under a project:
- <dir>/ (with trailing slash) → browse (the directory view; same
behaviour as today)
- <dir> (without trailing slash) → the canonical default tool for
that directory's context, served
inline (no 301 hop)
Tool mapping via the new apps.DefaultAppAt(root, dir):
- working/... → mdedit
- staging/... → transmittal
- archive/ → archive
- archive/<party>/ → archive
- archive/<party>/incoming|received|issued/... → archive
- archive/<party>/mdl/... → tables (the per-party MDL grid editor)
Directories outside the canonical layout (project root, scratch
folders) keep the legacy 301-to-trailing-slash redirect since no
default tool fits.
This generalises and replaces the bespoke
"GET archive/<party>/mdl/ → 302 mdl.table.html" redirect added in PR4.
The new dispatcher rule serves the table app inline at the bare-mdl
URL by routing through RecognizeTableRequest with the canonical
.table.html suffix appended; relative fetches resolve identically
because both URLs share the same parent directory.
Tests: TestDefaultAppAt covers all canonical positions plus
case-fold and out-of-tree edges. TestDispatchSlashRouting (replacing
the now-obsolete TestDispatchMdlRedirect) verifies the slash-vs-no-
slash distinction at every canonical folder + non-canonical
fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 821ed3ee19 |
feat(handler): mdl/ → table-app default with embedded fallback spec
Three pieces wire the per-party Master Deliverables List as the default
view at archive/<party>/mdl/:
1. **Dispatcher redirect.** GET (and HEAD) on
<project>/archive/<party>/mdl/ (case-fold on archive and mdl) now
302 → <project>/archive/<party>/mdl.table.html. Non-archive paths
and deeper mdl/ paths fall through unchanged.
2. **Default-spec fallback in RecognizeTableRequest.** When a request
matches archive/<party>/mdl.table.html and no operator-supplied
tables: { mdl: ... } declaration covers it, the handler returns a
recognised request anyway. Operator declarations still win — and a
typo'd declaration pointing at a missing file yields 404 (not a
silent fallback).
3. **Static-file fallback for the spec yaml.** GET archive/<party>/
mdl.table.yaml and archive/<party>/mdl.form.yaml return embedded
default bytes (default-mdl.{table,form}.yaml in the handler package)
when no operator file exists at that path. Operator files always
win because the dispatcher's os.Stat finds them before reaching the
IsDefaultMdlSpec branch.
The defaults use ZDDC vocabulary: tracking, title, discipline, type,
plannedRevision, plannedDate, status (DFT/IFR/IFA/IFC/AFC/AB), owner,
notes. Operators override per-party by writing
archive/<party>/{mdl.table.yaml,mdl.form.yaml} and a tables: { mdl: ... }
entry in the party's .zddc.
Tests:
- 4 dispatcher redirect cases (success, case-fold mdl, case-fold archive,
deeper-path skip, non-archive skip)
- 6 tablehandler cases (default fires at archive/<party>/, operator
override wins, scope check, embedded yaml served, operator yaml wins,
scope check on yaml fallback)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| a0f9fca95d |
feat(archive): canonicalize deep .archive URLs + permissions follow the file
The .archive virtual prefix is now project-scoped at exactly one URL
depth: any /<project>/<sub>/.../.archive/... gets a 301 to the
canonical /<project>/.archive/.... The dispatcher does this before
calling the handler; query strings are preserved (the browser handles
the fragment automatically). .archive is also GET/HEAD-only — anything
else returns 405 with Allow: GET, HEAD, ahead of the file API.
Why: offline-built HTML files reference siblings as
"../.archive/<tracking>.html" from arbitrary depths. All of those refs
should converge on a single stable URL per (project, tracking) so
external links and bookmarks don't fork by entry point.
Permissions now follow the resolved file, not .archive itself.
.archive is a virtual surface — it has no on-disk directory and no
.zddc of its own, so gating it as if it did is wrong. Two gates only:
- Resolve: only the per-target file's ACL chain decides. A user
explicitly allowed at one transmittal folder but denied at the
project root can still fetch tracking numbers that resolve there.
Per-target denial returns 404 (not 403) so existence doesn't leak.
- Listing: filter entries by per-target ACL. If the project bucket
has zero indexed entries → 404 (unknown / empty project, indistinguishable
from a probe). If the bucket is non-empty but the caller can read
no entries → 403 (existence-leak guard: don't confirm an inaccessible
project's archive exists). Otherwise → 200 with the filtered subset.
The listing endpoint is now content-negotiated like ServeDirectory:
Accept: text/html serves the embedded `browse` SPA bytes (with the
embedded ETag and X-ZDDC-Source: embedded:browse); Accept:
application/json returns the JSON entry array (with content-hash ETag
and 304 short-circuit). Vary: Accept set on both. The browse SPA's
auto-detect path-fetch then renders the archive entries as a sortable,
filterable flat list at /<project>/.archive/.
ServeArchive's signature is now (cfg, idx, w, r, project, filename) —
the dispatcher hands the normalized project string in directly, so
projectFromContextPath is gone. Old behavior was to derive project
from contextPath inside the handler; with the upstream redirect that's
redundant and the handler's preconditions are simpler.
Tests: archivehandler_test.go rewritten around the new semantics;
added per-target-only resolve, project-root-deny + per-target-allow
rescue, listing 403/404 distinction, JSON/HTML content-negotiation,
and conditional GET. main_test.go gains TestDispatchArchiveRedirect
(deep paths, query preservation, already-canonical no-op) and
TestDispatchArchiveMethodGate (PUT/POST/DELETE → 405).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 610b7ef65a |
feat(archive): periodic rescan + admin reindex endpoint
The fsnotify watcher only sees events the local kernel generates, so on
SMB/CIFS-backed roots (Azure Files) writes from any other client are
invisible — the archive index would silently miss them until pod
restart. Add two backstops:
1. Periodic full re-walk via Index.Rebuild on a configurable interval
(--archive-rescan-interval / ZDDC_ARCHIVE_RESCAN_INTERVAL, default
60s, 0 to disable). Atomically swaps ByProject under the existing
RWMutex; concurrent reads stay safe.
2. Admin-only POST /.profile/reindex that triggers an immediate rebuild
and returns {duration_ms, project_count, tracking_count}, for the
"I just dropped 50 files and don't want to wait" case. Gated by
IsAdmin with the same 404-on-non-admin pattern as the other admin
sub-resources.
Tests: TestRebuild_PicksUpAddsAndDrops covers add+drop semantics and
returned counts; TestServeProfileReindexPOST covers the happy admin
path; matrix entries cover the gate (anonymous/non-admin → 404, admin
GET → 405 method-not-allowed since the route is POST-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 9ca36f25d8 |
feat(tables): new sortable/filterable grid tool for directories of YAML files
Tables is the eighth HTML tool: a read-only tabular view over a
directory of YAML files declared via `tables:` in `.zddc`. Anchor use
case is the Master Deliverables List, where each row is one
`<tracking>.yaml` under `Archive/<Party>/MDL/`. Rows click through to
the existing form renderer for editing.
Schema (zddc/internal/zddc/file.go)
- New `Tables map[string]string` on ZddcFile. Map key becomes the URL
stem (`tables[MDL]` → `<dir>/MDL.table.html`); the value is a path
relative to the .zddc pointing at a `*.table.yaml` spec describing
columns + the rows directory. No upward cascade in v1 — each
directory hosting a table declares it directly.
Server handler (zddc/internal/handler/tablehandler.go)
- `RecognizeTableRequest` matches GET `/<dir>/<name>.table.html`
against the cascade's `tables:` declarations. Dispatch routes
table requests before the form-system intercept.
- `ServeTable` ACL-gates with `policy.ActionRead` and serves the
embedded `tables.html` template; client walks the directory itself
via the listing JSON or FS Access API.
- tables.html embedded via //go:embed — same pattern as form.html.
Frontend (tables/)
- Vanilla JS: app/context/util/filters/sort/render/main modules.
- Reads spec + row YAML files via window.zddc.source (HTTP polyfill
or local FS handle); js-yaml 4.1.0 vendored in shared/vendor for
client-side parsing.
- Sample fixtures under tables/sample/ for local testing.
Build + CI
- Lockstep build registers tables alongside the other 7 tools (HTML
output, embed mirror, versions.txt, release-output, tags).
- Playwright project added; `npx playwright test --project=tables`
is part of `npm test`.
Drive-by: rename mdedit Playwright selectors `#select-directory` →
`#addDirectoryBtn` to fix three pre-existing failing tests.
Drive-by: ignore locally-built `zddc/zddc-server` binary so it doesn't
get accidentally staged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 3115e388fc |
feat(server): authenticated CRUD + verb-based RBAC with WORM archive folders
Replaces the binary acl.allow/deny model with five permission verbs
(r/w/c/d/a) and first-class roles, and adds an authenticated file API
(PUT/DELETE/POST move/mkdir) so the HTML tools can edit-in-place over
HTTP. Closes the AC-3(7) and AC-6 federal-readiness gaps.
File API (zddc/internal/handler/fileapi.go)
- PUT <new> → action c
- PUT <existing> → action w
- PUT <.zddc> → action a (CanEditZddc strict-ancestor rule)
- DELETE → action d
- POST mkdir → action c (auto-writes creator-owned .zddc when the
parent is Incoming/Working/Staging)
- POST move → action w on src + c on dst, atomic via os.Rename
- Optional If-Match for optimistic concurrency, --max-write-bytes cap,
audit log emits a structured file_write event per operation.
Permission model (zddc/internal/zddc/{acl,file,roles,cascade_mode}.go)
- acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set } map; principals are email
patterns or role names. Empty verb set is an explicit deny.
- roles: { name → members } definitions, available at the level they
declare and all descendants. Closer-to-leaf shadows ancestor.
- Legacy acl.allow/deny still work; they fold into permissions at
parse time (allow → "rwcd", deny → "").
- Cascade walks leaf→root; first level with any matching entry wins;
the union of matching verb sets at that level decides.
- --cascade-mode=strict adds a root→leaf ancestor-deny pre-pass so an
ancestor explicit-deny is absolute (NIST AC-6). Default delegated
preserves the existing commercial behavior.
Special folders (zddc/internal/zddc/special.go)
- Incoming / Working / Staging: mkdir auto-writes a .zddc into the new
subdir granting created_by + that email rwcda directly. Same form
operators write by hand; creator can edit it later to add others.
- Issued / Received: server-enforced WORM split. Cascade grants
inherited from above the WORM folder are masked to r only; grants
placed at-or-below the WORM folder retain r,c. Operators grant
write-once (cr) to the doc controller via an explicit .zddc at the
Issued/Received folder. Admins exempt — only escape hatch.
Browser polyfill (shared/zddc-source.js)
- HttpDirectoryHandle + HttpFileHandle implement the FS Access API
surface (values, getFileHandle, createWritable, removeEntry,
queryPermission/requestPermission) over zddc-server's listing JSON
and file API. Existing tools written against showDirectoryPicker
work unchanged.
- detectServerRoot() returns { handle, status }: tools auto-load on
HTTP, surface a clear "no permission to list" message on 403, and
fall back to the welcome screen on 0.
- classifier renames take the atomic POST move path on HTTP-backed
handles; mdedit and transmittal route reads/writes through the
polyfill so prior FS-API code paths cover both modes.
Tests
- zddc/internal/zddc/{cascade_mode,roles,special,acl}_test.go cover
delegated vs strict, role membership / shadowing / legacy fallback,
WORM split semantics, verb-set parser round-trip.
- zddc/internal/handler/fileapi_test.go now also covers role-based
vendor scenarios, WORM blocking vendor & doc controller writes,
explicit Issued .zddc unlocking the cr drop-box, admin bypass,
auto-ownership on mkdir, and strict-mode lockouts.
Docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md + zddc/README.md document the verb model, role
syntax, special-folder behaviors, cascade-mode flag, and full file
API surface. Federal-readiness gap analysis strikes AC-3(7) and
AC-6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 52dde0b014 |
feat(apps): also accept apps_pubkey: inline in root .zddc
Adds a second way to configure the apps signing pubkey alongside the existing --apps-pubkey / ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (path-to-PEM-file) form: an inline PEM block under apps_pubkey: in the root .zddc file. Resolution order: 1. --apps-pubkey / ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (path) ← env/flag wins 2. apps_pubkey: inline PEM in root .zddc ← second 3. nothing ← URL fetches refused Honored only at the root .zddc — same trust-anchor treatment as the existing admins: field. Subtree write authority cannot re-anchor trust because subtree apps_pubkey: entries are ignored. (Same unmarshal pattern as the rest of ZddcFile; the root-only enforcement is in setupApps where we explicitly read filepath.Join(cfg.Root, ".zddc") rather than walking a chain.) Why offer both: env/flag fits k8s + systemd deployment shapes where the operator already manages a config volume and prefers env-based plumbing. Inline-in-.zddc fits the "everything in one config file" mental model and matches how operators already think about admins: and acl:. Either ships a working URL-fetch-verify story; the choice is operator preference. Logged differently per source so operators can grep for which path populated the key: apps signing pubkey loaded source=env/flag path=/path/to/pubkey.pem apps signing pubkey loaded source="root .zddc apps_pubkey" Smoke-tested end-to-end: a root .zddc with inline apps_pubkey: PEM block + apps: archive: <upstream-URL> + ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY unset — the server logs "loaded source=root .zddc apps_pubkey" at startup, fetches the URL, verifies the .sig against the inline key, caches. Tampering still rejects; missing .sig still rejects; everything that worked yesterday still works. Docs: env-var tables in zddc/README.md and AGENTS.md note the inline alternative; the federal-readiness gap analysis subsection on code signing now lists both paths in its resolution order; the release-page "Verify your downloads" section mentions both for operators. Production binary unchanged at ~13 MB. All 11 Go test packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 9765fa2f5e |
feat(apps): code-signed URL fetches; dev chart overlays prod data RO
Two interlocking pieces shipped together: 1. Strict Ed25519 signature verification on URL-fetched apps artifacts. Every URL the apps cascade resolves must publish a corresponding <url>.sig (raw 64-byte Ed25519 signature). The fetcher rejects on any failure (sig 404, transport error, wrong key, tampered body) and the resolver falls back to the embedded copy. The trusted public key is OPERATOR-CONFIGURED via --apps-pubkey / ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (PEM file path). No baked-in default — same posture as TLS certificates. Operators using zddc.varasys.io's canonical channels download pubkey.pem from there and configure the local path. Operators with their own signing infrastructure pass their own public key. Build pipeline (./build) gains sign_release_artifacts: walks dist/release-output/ after promote and produces an Ed25519 .sig alongside every real file. ZDDC_SIGNING_KEY=~/.config/zddc-signing/ key.pem (mode 0600). Symlinks skip — the .sig at the symlink target is what counts. Test coverage: parse-PEM round-trip, malformed/wrong-type PEM rejection, valid-signature accept, tampered-body reject, wrong-key reject, malformed-signature reject, end-to-end fetch+sign+verify, fetch-rejects-tampered, fetch-rejects-missing-sig, fetch-rejects- wrong-key. Existing fetch tests updated to use signed-fixture helpers. 2. Dev Helm chart mounts production data READ-ONLY and layers an OverlayFS writable scratch on top. Prod data is the lowerdir; dev's writes (form submissions, archive index state, .zddc edits) land in upperdir; main container sees the merged read-write view at $ZDDC_ROOT. Setup runs in a privileged init container; main container runs unprivileged. Solves the dev-replica-on-shared- dataset problem at the filesystem layer with no zddc-server code change. Docs: env-var tables in zddc/README.md and AGENTS.md gain a ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY row. The Federal-readiness gap analysis "Code-signed apps: URL fetches" subsection is rewritten as "what's currently in place" instead of "what would need to be added," with a forward pointer to per-entry signed_by: (multi-key) and Sigstore as the federally-acceptable evolution. The website "Verify your downloads" section + the embedded pubkey gone — but the website needs separate updates landing in zddc-website to publish pubkey.pem and add the verify section. Pending in that repo's commit. Production binary unchanged at 13.1 MB. All 11 Go test packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| d3a9ea7ad9 |
feat(server): federal-mode reference Rego (parent-deny-is-absolute)
Ship a second parity-tested Rego policy that flips the cascade's
leaf-allow-overrides-parent-deny rule for NIST AC-6 conformance.
Standard cascade (existing access.rego, mirrors internal Go evaluator):
Bottom-up walk; first explicit match wins; deny-first within a level.
A leaf-level allow CAN override an ancestor's deny. This is the
cascade's intentional delegation property — a project-owner who
re-allows a previously-denied collaborator works as expected.
Federal mode (new access_federal.rego):
Any deny anywhere along the chain is absolute. An allow only matters
if no level (any depth) has denied the same email. Required by
NIST AC-6 default expectations: a central admin's deny at the root
must be unbypassable by a tenant who controls a subtree's .zddc.
Operators run real OPA with this Rego and point ZDDC_OPA_URL at it;
the internal Go evaluator stays on the commercial cascade. The
toggle is "which policy does your OPA evaluate," not a knob inside
zddc-server.
Surfaced via --print-rego flag:
zddc-server --print-rego # standard (default)
zddc-server --print-rego=standard # same
zddc-server --print-rego=federal # AC-6 strict variant
Parity test (federal_parity_test.go) compiles both Regos and asserts:
* They AGREE on every cascade scenario where no ancestor-deny
intersects a leaf-allow (most cases).
* They DISAGREE — by design — on the three scenarios where the
AC-6 rule differs:
- "leaf allows what parent denied" → standard allows, federal denies
- "deep leaf re-allows after middle deny" → same
- "glob deny at root + specific allow at leaf" → same
Cross-checks the divergence flag explicitly so any future change that
accidentally collapses the two policies fails the test.
Closes the AC-6 row of the federal-readiness gap analysis (now marked
"partially complete" in zddc/README.md — the full bullet would be a
built-in --policy-mode=federal toggle that also flips the in-process
Go evaluator).
Production binary unchanged at 13.1 MB (Rego files embedded as bytes;
OPA library remains test-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 460d5fdada |
feat(server): TLS hardening per NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2 + HSTS
The TLS configuration was using Go stdlib defaults — secure for typical
commercial use, but federal evaluators need an explicit cipher
allowlist they can map to a FIPS-validated implementation. Pin the
cipher and curve lists to NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2 § 3.3 conformant
values:
Ciphers (TLS 1.2):
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
Curves: X25519, P-256, P-384
MinVersion: TLS 1.2 (already set; 1.3 used when negotiated)
TLS 1.3 cipher selection is not operator-controllable in Go stdlib
(the runtime picks from a fixed AEAD-only set); all of those
already meet the federal bar so no change needed there.
Also adds HSTSMiddleware emitting `Strict-Transport-Security:
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` when zddc-server is itself
terminating TLS (ZDDC_TLS_CERT != none). Behind an upstream proxy
terminating TLS the proxy is responsible for HSTS, so the middleware
only wraps the chain when useTLS=true.
Test coverage:
* TLSConfig(none) returns nil + useTLS=false
* TLSConfig(selfsigned) sets the exact NIST allowlist
* Negative test asserting weak ciphers (CBC, RC4, 3DES, RSA-key-
exchange) are NOT in the list — guardrail against regressions
Federal-readiness gap analysis updated: this control is now partially
complete. OCSP stapling and CT-log inclusion remain on the list for
full DoD STIG conformance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| a01315fd00 |
feat(server): reference Rego, parity test, decision cache, listing ETags
Phase 2 enhancements to the policy decider, plus listing-level ETags
that benefit every deployment regardless of decider mode.
Reference Rego policy
---------------------
internal/policy/rego/access.rego mirrors InternalDecider's semantics
exactly — bottom-up walk, deny-first within a level, default-deny when
HasAnyFile=true, glob matching with @-boundary semantics (special-cased
bare "*" because OPA's glob.match treats empty delimiters
inconsistently for that pattern).
Embedded into the binary via go:embed; --print-rego dumps it to stdout
so federal customers standing up an external OPA can use it as a
parity-tested baseline:
zddc-server --print-rego > /etc/opa/policies/zddc-access.rego
Parity test runner
------------------
parity_test.go imports the OPA Go module as a TEST-ONLY dependency
(github.com/open-policy-agent/opa@v0.70.0). Every fixture from the
internal Go evaluator's test set runs through both implementations;
any divergence fails CI. The test-only import means production
binaries (built by `go build ./cmd/zddc-server`) stay OPA-free —
release-flag binary size unchanged at ~13 MB.
The parity test caught a real bug on first run: bare "*" patterns
didn't match through OPA's glob.match with empty delimiters. Fixed
in access.rego with a special-case rule. This is exactly the kind of
subtle drift the parity guard exists to catch.
External-mode decision cache
----------------------------
HTTPDecider is now wrapped in a cachingDecider with a default 1s TTL.
Bursty patterns like .archive listings (one OPA round-trip per entry
before, one per (email, decision-input) tuple per TTL window after)
amortize cleanly. Verified: 20 identical /D/ requests produce 1 OPA
hit with cache, 40 hits without (each listing makes 2 ACL queries).
ZDDC_OPA_CACHE_TTL knob (default 1s) lets operators tune. 0 disables.
1s matches the fsnotify watcher debounce window — staleness is
bounded the same way other policy-edit propagation already is.
Internal mode unchanged; the in-process Go evaluator is already
cheaper than a cache lookup would be.
Listing ETags
-------------
GET / (project list) and GET /<dir>/ (directory listing JSON) now
carry content-hash ETag + Cache-Control: private, max-age=0,
must-revalidate. SHA-256 of the rendered JSON, truncated to 16 hex
chars (64 bits — collision risk on a listing of any realistic size
is vanishingly small).
Server-side caching deliberately not added: it would require
mtime-based invalidation, and Azure Files SMB mounts (a common
deployment substrate) don't support fsnotify reliably. The
content-hash ETag delivers the bandwidth savings (304 on identical
fetches) without depending on watcher correctness — the hash is the
actual response, so it can't lie about staleness regardless of
underlying watcher behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| e911806eda |
feat(server): pluggable OPA-compatible policy decider
Add an internal access-decision boundary that all handlers go through
instead of calling zddc.AllowedWithChain directly. Two implementations
ship:
* InternalDecider — wraps the existing zddc.AllowedWithChain. The
default. No new dependencies, identical semantics to the legacy
code path. ZDDC_OPA_URL=internal (or unset).
* HTTPDecider — POSTs the canonical OPA wire format
(POST /v1/data/zddc/access/allow with {"input": {...}}, response
{"result": true|false}) over HTTP, HTTPS, or a Unix-domain socket.
For federal customers running their own audited Rego policies
alongside zddc-server. ZDDC_OPA_URL=http(s)://… or unix:///….
External-mode failure semantics: unreachable / non-2xx / malformed
response → fail closed (deny) by default with a WARN log. Operators
who prefer availability over correctness flip with ZDDC_OPA_FAIL_OPEN=1.
The decider is constructed once at startup, plumbed through ACLMiddleware
into the request context. Handlers retrieve it via DeciderFromContext;
non-request callers (fs.ListDirectory, EnumerateProjects, enumerateAccess)
take it as an explicit parameter.
zddc.ZddcFile and zddc.ACLRules gain JSON tags so external Rego authors
get idiomatic input shape (acl.allow, admins, …) instead of Go field
names (ACL.Allow, Admins, …).
Test coverage:
* InternalDecider parity tests against zddc.AllowedWithChain (every
documented cascade scenario: empty chain, leaf-allow-wins, leaf-
deny-beats-parent, leaf-allows-what-parent-denies, deepest-match-
wins, etc.)
* HTTPDecider happy-path test (canonical wire format)
* Fail-closed / fail-open / malformed-response tests
Production binary size unchanged (no new deps; HTTP transport is
stdlib net/http). 11 ACL call sites migrated. End-to-end verified
against the worked-example layout in zddc/README.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| df1c32ff54 |
feat(server): HTTP timeouts + audit log default-on with hostname tagging
Two related operational improvements: 1. HTTP timeouts on http.Server (ReadHeaderTimeout 10s, ReadTimeout + WriteTimeout 60s, IdleTimeout 120s). Caps slow-client connection hold time; closes the slowloris vector. Listing + tool-HTML responses complete in milliseconds even with gzip, so 60s is generous for legit traffic. 2. --access-log defaults to <ZDDC_ROOT>/.zddc.d/logs/access-<host>.log instead of stderr-only. The server auto-creates the parent tree (mode 0750), so a fresh deployment gets an audit trail without operator setup. Every JSON record carries a `host` field (from os.Hostname) — multi-replica deployments share the .zddc.d/logs/ directory but write to per-host filenames, and downstream aggregators can disambiguate via the host field. Opt-out: --access-log= (explicit empty). Distinguishing "unset" from "set to empty" follows the same pattern config.go already uses for --cors-origin. Live verification: $ zddc-server -root /tmp/r -addr 127.0.0.1:8765 -tls-cert none -insecure-direct $ curl http://127.0.0.1:8765/ $ ls /tmp/r/.zddc.d/logs/ access-bizon.log $ tail -1 /tmp/r/.zddc.d/logs/access-bizon.log {"time":...,"level":"INFO","msg":"access","host":"bizon",...,"email":"anonymous","method":"GET","path":"/","status":200,...} $ zddc-server -root /tmp/r ... -access-log= # opt-out $ ls /tmp/r/.zddc.d/ # empty: no logs/ created |
|||
| 411f49169b |
feat(server): tee access log to a rotated file for on-disk audit trail
Add --access-log <path> (env ZDDC_ACCESS_LOG). When set, every access- log record is written as a JSON line to the configured file in addition to the existing slog.Default() stderr output. Empty (default) keeps the prior behavior — stderr only. Rotation via gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2: 100 MB per file, 10 backups, 90-day max age, gzip rotated files. Operator usage (e.g. behind a Caddy/quadlet stack): zddc-server --access-log /srv/.zddc.d/logs/access.log ... Architecture: AccessLogMiddleware now takes an optional *slog.Logger. main.go wires it via setupAccessAuditLog() which builds a slog.JSONHandler over a lumberjack rotator. Stderr emission stays via slog.Default(); the audit logger gets the same fields in line-delimited JSON, the format every standard log shipper (Vector, Loki, fluentbit, journalbeat) parses natively. Tests cover the audit logger receiving the same email/path/status fields as the stderr stream. |
|||
| 50dd8f9bda |
perf(server): gzip compression middleware on the entire mux
Add github.com/klauspost/compress/gzhttp wrapper around the request
handler. With MinSize(1024), responses ≥ 1 KB get gzip-encoded when
the client advertises Accept-Encoding: gzip; smaller bodies + 304
Not Modified pass through unchanged.
The wrapper auto-appends Vary: Accept-Encoding (compatible with the
existing Vary: Accept on directory.go's content-negotiated path).
Live-tested against zddc-server -root /tmp/empty:
GET / w/ Accept-Encoding: gzip → 20.9 KB compressed (was 80.9 KB
uncompressed). 74% reduction.
Decompresses cleanly back to the original bytes.
Helps every code path that bypasses Caddy: devshell pods, local dev
binaries, tests, anywhere zddc-server is hit directly. Production
behind Caddy already had compression at the proxy layer; this just
makes the Go server self-sufficient.
Tests in cmd/zddc-server/main_test.go cover:
- large body + Accept-Encoding → compressed + Vary header
- small body → not compressed (under MinSize)
- no Accept-Encoding header → plain bytes
|
|||
| 20897fef6b |
feat(server): public landing page (root bypasses dir-level ACL)
GET / and GET /index.html previously enforced the root .zddc's
top-level acl: gate before serving the landing page. On a deployment
where only specific emails are allowed at root, anonymous (and
unauthorized) callers got 403 — they couldn't even see the project
picker that would tell them which projects were available to them.
Make the landing page public:
- cmd/zddc-server: drop the AllowedWithChain gate from the
apps.Serve("landing") branch; drop it from the IsDir branch when
urlPath == "/".
- handler/directory.go: matching bypass for ServeDirectory at the
root path (covers Accept: application/json and the case where a
real /index.html exists on disk).
Per-project ACL is preserved end-to-end:
- fs.ListDirectory continues to filter sub-entries per email, so
anonymous callers see only projects whose .zddc allows them.
- Subdirectory requests still hit the ACL gate.
Regression test in handler/directory_test.go covers all four cases
(anonymous public, anonymous filters out private, admin sees both,
anonymous still 403 on private subdir). Full go test ./... passes.
|
|||
| a02a26d3c2 |
feat: form-data system v0 (sixth tool + zddc-server endpoints)
All checks were successful
Build + deploy releases / build-and-deploy (push) Successful in 8s
Schema-driven form renderer plus zddc-server endpoints that turn any
<name>.form.yaml into a working data-collection form at <path>/<name>.form.html.
Submissions land in <path>/<name>/<YYYY-MM-DD>-<email-sanitized>.yaml,
ACL-gated by the existing .zddc cascade. The form posts back to its own URL;
the server strips ".html" and routes by what's underneath, so create and
update use the same client-side code path.
Form spec dialect: JSON Schema 2020-12 + RJSF-style ui:* hints, written in
YAML. Chosen for LLM authorability — it's the canonical structured-output
target for OpenAI/Anthropic, and the ui:* convention is the most-trained UI
hint vocabulary. Supported subset for v0: type (string/number/integer/boolean/
array/object), enum, min/max, minLength/maxLength, required, additionalProperties:
false, properties, items, format (date, email). Round-trip mode is form-as-truth:
submission YAML is regenerated each save, comments are not preserved (the v1
file-as-truth mode for hand-edited files like .zddc itself is deferred).
New components:
* form/ — sixth single-file HTML tool, vanilla JS renderer (~760 LoC)
* zddc/internal/jsonschema/ — focused JSON Schema validator covering only
the v0 keyword subset. Match-implementation-cost-to-surface-used: a full
library brings 70%+ surface we don't use; revisit when v1 adds $ref +
oneOf + if/then/else.
* zddc/internal/handler/formhandler.go — RecognizeFormRequest / ServeForm,
capability-URL re-edit, atomic submission writes via the new
zddc.WriteAtomic helper extracted from writer.go.
* dispatch() in zddc-server/main.go now intercepts *.form.html and
*.yaml.html before the static-file path; spec existence is the trigger.
Build pipeline: form joins ZDDC_RELEASE_TOOLS in lockstep, gets its own
embedded copy in handler/form.html (separate from the apps cascade —
the form renderer is fixed, not subject to per-folder version overrides).
Tests: 5 new Playwright specs (form-safety) + 14 new Go tests across the
validator and handler. All 172 Playwright tests + 10 Go packages green.
End-to-end manual verification: GET empty → POST 201 + capability URL →
GET re-edit (pre-filled) → POST update → 200, raw YAML browsable, ACL
deny → 403.
Docs: form/ section added to AGENTS.md and ARCHITECTURE.md. AGENTS.md
also documents the implementation-vs-dependency policy. CLAUDE.md repo-shape
list extended.
Deferred (v1+): .zddc editor migration onto this system, file-as-truth
lossless YAML round-trip, ui:show-when conditional visibility, oneOf/anyOf,
apps-cascade preview hook, cascade-fetched form definitions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 6cc0d2ae27 |
feat(zddc-server): /.auth/admin forward_auth endpoint
A machine-only HTTP endpoint that returns 200 if the request's X-Auth-Request-Email is in the root .zddc admins: list, 403 otherwise. No body, no redirect — pure authorization decision intended to be polled by an upstream proxy's forward_auth directive. The motivating use case is gating /devshell/* (code-server) in the dev-shell pod on root-admin status before the request ever reaches code-server, which has no built-in ACL of its own. zddc-server's own routes keep the existing .zddc cascade ACL and don't go through this endpoint. Reuses zddc.IsAdmin (one cached map lookup) so the check is cheap enough to call on every request. Edits to /srv/.zddc propagate via the existing fsnotify watcher's policy-cache invalidation. Tests cover empty email, non-admin, admin, and the bootstrap state where no root .zddc exists (deny everyone — the safe default). Docs: zddc/README.md "Forward-auth target for upstream proxies" section + AGENTS.md notes bullet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| 4ede42010a |
feat(zddc-server): CLI flags, --version, CWD-default ZDDC_ROOT
Adds command-line flags to zddc-server alongside the existing env vars.
Each setting can be set via --<flag-name> or ZDDC_<NAME>; the flag wins
on conflict, the env var wins over the hard-coded default.
--root / ZDDC_ROOT (now defaults to CWD if both unset)
--addr / ZDDC_ADDR (:8443)
--tls-cert / ZDDC_TLS_CERT ("none" / empty / path)
--tls-key / ZDDC_TLS_KEY
--log-level / ZDDC_LOG_LEVEL (info)
--index-path / ZDDC_INDEX_PATH (.archive)
--email-header / ZDDC_EMAIL_HEADER (X-Auth-Request-Email)
--cors-origin / ZDDC_CORS_ORIGIN (https://zddc.varasys.io; "" disables)
--insecure-direct / ZDDC_INSECURE_DIRECT (false)
--help (prints flag list to stderr, exits 0)
--version (prints binary + embedded tool versions, exits 0)
So an operator can `cd /srv/zddc && zddc-server` with zero config — the
served root defaults to the current directory, and TLS defaults to a
self-signed cert. config.Load now takes []string (test-friendly: nil
skips flag parsing entirely; tests pass an empty slice for env-only
loads).
Adds a `version` package-level var in main.go injected at link time via
`-ldflags="-X main.version=..."`. The build.sh runs git describe against
zddc-server-v* tags; for in-flight commits between releases it produces
e.g. zddc-server-v0.0.7-19-gadb6904-dirty.
Adds an embedded versions manifest:
- Each tool's compute_build_label (in shared/build-lib.sh) writes a
sidecar <tool>.label to $BUILD_LABELS_DIR if that env var is set.
- Top-level build.sh sets BUILD_LABELS_DIR before running each tool's
build, then assembles zddc/internal/apps/embedded/versions.txt as
one `<app>=<build label>` line per app.
- apps.EmbeddedVersions() loads the manifest at runtime.
- main.go logs a compact summary on every startup; --version dumps
the full per-app label.
Removes the old cfg.BuildVersion field — the X-ZDDC-Source: embedded
header now uses the package-level main.version directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 8b6a2dc3e3 |
feat(zddc-server): apps fetch+cache subsystem with cascade overrides
Adds internal/apps/ package serving the five tool HTMLs at virtual paths based on the surrounding folder name convention: archive every directory (multi-project, project, archive, vendor) classifier any Incoming/Working/Staging directory and subtree mdedit any Working directory and subtree transmittal any Staging directory and subtree landing only at deployment root The current-stable build of every tool is //go:embed'd into the binary at compile time — that's the default with zero config. Operators override per-directory via .zddc apps: entries; closer-to-leaf wins. Spec syntax (in any apps: value): stable / beta / alpha / :stable channel v0.0.4 / v0.0 / v0 / :v0.0.4 version https://my-mirror/releases URL prefix only https://my-mirror/releases:beta URL prefix + channel https://my-fork/archive.html terminal full URL ./local.html / /abs/path.html terminal local path The special apps.default key provides a baseline URL prefix and channel inherited by any app not overridden per-name. Per-axis cascade: a deeper .zddc can override the URL, the channel, or both. Cascade walks root→leaf; default applies first at each level, then the per-app entry. Terminal sources (paths and full .html URLs) short-circuit composition; deeper non-terminal entries override parent terminals. URL sources fetch once on first request and cache forever in <ZDDC_ROOT>/_app/<host>/<path> — different upstreams with the same filename stay distinct. No background refresh, no SHA-256 verification: operators delete the cache file to force a refetch. Concurrent misses for the same source dedupe via a 30-line hand-rolled singleflight. Per-request override: any user can append ?v=<spec> to a tool URL (e.g. ?v=beta, ?v=v0.0.4, ?v=:alpha, ?v=https://mirror/releases:beta) to ask for a different build for one request. Security: ?v= serves ONLY versions already in the cache (cache miss returns 404; path sources are rejected outright with 400). Users cannot trigger arbitrary upstream fetches via crafted URLs. Failed URL fetches (network down, 5xx) fall back to embedded with a one-time WARN log. The X-ZDDC-Source response header reports what served: fetch:URL / cache:URL / path:/abs / embedded:<app>@<build>. Wire-in (cmd/zddc-server/main.go): dispatch routes <dir>/<app>.html through apps.MatchAppHTML + AppAvailableAt + apps.Server.Serve when no real file exists. Direct URL access to /_app/... is blocked at the dispatch layer — cached files must go through the apps resolver so they get correct Content-Type and ACL gating. Schema (internal/zddc/file.go): ZddcFile gains Apps map[string]string for cascade overrides. Validator (internal/zddc/validate.go) accepts the special "default" key alongside the five canonical app names and all spec forms. Removes ZDDC_APPS_* env vars (no admin UI, no refresh interval, no upstream allow-list — the simpler model has fewer knobs). 40+ unit tests across the new package: parser shapes, cascade resolution with default+per-app interactions, terminal short-circuit semantics, ?v= cache-only enforcement, embedded fallback, atomic cache writes, singleflight dedup. Plus end-to-end dispatch tests in cmd/zddc-server/main_test.go. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| fedc3650b5 |
fix(zddc-server): access log was always email=anonymous (middleware ordering)
The middleware chain in main.go was:
AccessLogMiddleware ( CORSMiddleware ( ACLMiddleware ( dispatch ) ) )
ACLMiddleware extracts the user email from the configured header and
stores it in the request context via r.WithContext. But Go's context
propagates DOWN the chain (to handlers further in) — not back UP. The
new context-bearing request only exists inside the call to
next.ServeHTTP; once that returns, the outer middleware still has the
ORIGINAL request without the email. So AccessLogMiddleware's
EmailFromContext(r) call (which runs after next.ServeHTTP returns to
log the request) read from the original context and got an empty
string, falling through to "anonymous".
The /.profile/ page worked correctly because it reads the email
directly inside the handler — at that depth the context-bearing
request is the one in scope.
Fix: invert the chain so ACL is OUTERMOST.
ACLMiddleware ( AccessLogMiddleware ( CORSMiddleware ( dispatch ) ) )
Now ACL extracts the email and the new request flows down through
AccessLog (which sees the email-bearing context), CORS, and dispatch.
Add three regression tests in middleware_test.go:
TestAccessLogReadsEmailFromACLContext
The fix: with ACL outer, AccessLog logs email=alice@example.com
when X-Auth-Request-Email is set.
TestAccessLogAnonymousWhenNoEmail
The unchanged path: no header → email=anonymous (correct fallback).
TestAccessLogOuterDoesNotSeeInnerContext
Locks down Go's actual context-propagation behavior. Builds the
INVERTED (buggy) chain and asserts that AccessLog (outer) does NOT
see the email ACL (inner) set. If this ever fails, Go's context
propagation has changed in a way that lets inner-set context flow
upward — which would mean the reordering fix could be reverted.
All zddc-server tests pass via `go test ./...` (run in podman against
golang:1.24-alpine since this dev host doesn't have Go installed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| cb46c2ef8c |
feat(zddc-server): user profile page replaces /.admin/
Replaces the super-admin-only /.admin/ surface with a public-by-default /.profile/ page that layers admin tools server-side based on the caller's effective access: - Universal (everyone, anonymous included): identity card, effective access summary, theme picker, localStorage utilities (export / import / clear, landing-presets viewer). - Subtree admins additionally see: editable .zddc files list (linking to the existing form-based editor) and a "Create new project folder" form. - Super-admins additionally see: server config, log viewer, whoami headers (the old /.admin/ JSON endpoints, repointed under /.profile/). Project creation is gated on CanEditZddc(newDir) — the same strict- ancestor rule that already governs .zddc writes — so no new authority concept is introduced. ValidateProjectName mirrors the existing reserved-prefix policy (no leading '.' or '_', no path separators). /.admin/* is hard-cut: no redirect shim. Old URLs fall through to the existing dot-prefix guard and 404. Custom CSS file rename: prefer <root>/.profile.css, fall back to legacy <root>/.admin.css. Per-resource 404 leakage gates preserved on whoami / config / logs / zddc / projects so non-admin callers cannot detect the existence of admin-only sub-resources. Tree-wide gofmt -w applied as a side-effect. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| 9ef90800b1 |
feat(zddc-server): admin debug page + X-Auth-Request-Email default + hidden-segment guard
Three improvements bundled because they all ship as zddc-server v0.0.2: * /.admin/ debug dashboard with /whoami, /config, /logs sub-routes. Authorization via a top-level `admins:` glob list in <ZDDC_ROOT>/.zddc (root-only — subdir entries deliberately ignored to prevent privilege escalation via subtree write access). Non-admin requests get 404 so the page is invisible. Recent logs surface via a 500-entry slog ring buffer teed off the existing TextHandler. Lets operators debug without kubectl exec. * Default ZDDC_EMAIL_HEADER changes from `X-Email` to `X-Auth-Request-Email` — the oauth2-proxy / nginx auth-request convention that the TND helm chart already sets explicitly. Operators who set the env var explicitly are unaffected; deployments relying on the previous default need to set ZDDC_EMAIL_HEADER=X-Email or update their proxy. * dispatch() rejects any URL whose segments contain a dot prefix other than the recognized virtual prefixes (.admin, cfg.IndexPath / .archive). Matches the existing listing-pipeline filter so hidden subtrees on the served PVC (e.g. /srv/.devshell — used by the in-cluster dev-shell for persistent home-dir state) become unreachable via direct HTTP fetch, not just hidden in listings. Refreshes the X-Email reference in website/index.html accordingly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| ea385b5366 |
Initial commit
ZDDC — Zero Day Document Control. A file-naming convention plus five single-file HTML tools (archive, transmittal, classifier, mdedit, landing) and an optional Go HTTP server (zddc-server) with ACL and a virtual archive index. Self-contained, offline-capable, dependency-free. See README.md for an overview, AGENTS.md and ARCHITECTURE.md for the build/release/architecture detail, bootstrap/README.md for the two-level deployment install pattern, and zddc/README.md for the HTTP server. |
