Replaces the binary acl.allow/deny model with five permission verbs
(r/w/c/d/a) and first-class roles, and adds an authenticated file API
(PUT/DELETE/POST move/mkdir) so the HTML tools can edit-in-place over
HTTP. Closes the AC-3(7) and AC-6 federal-readiness gaps.
File API (zddc/internal/handler/fileapi.go)
- PUT <new> → action c
- PUT <existing> → action w
- PUT <.zddc> → action a (CanEditZddc strict-ancestor rule)
- DELETE → action d
- POST mkdir → action c (auto-writes creator-owned .zddc when the
parent is Incoming/Working/Staging)
- POST move → action w on src + c on dst, atomic via os.Rename
- Optional If-Match for optimistic concurrency, --max-write-bytes cap,
audit log emits a structured file_write event per operation.
Permission model (zddc/internal/zddc/{acl,file,roles,cascade_mode}.go)
- acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set } map; principals are email
patterns or role names. Empty verb set is an explicit deny.
- roles: { name → members } definitions, available at the level they
declare and all descendants. Closer-to-leaf shadows ancestor.
- Legacy acl.allow/deny still work; they fold into permissions at
parse time (allow → "rwcd", deny → "").
- Cascade walks leaf→root; first level with any matching entry wins;
the union of matching verb sets at that level decides.
- --cascade-mode=strict adds a root→leaf ancestor-deny pre-pass so an
ancestor explicit-deny is absolute (NIST AC-6). Default delegated
preserves the existing commercial behavior.
Special folders (zddc/internal/zddc/special.go)
- Incoming / Working / Staging: mkdir auto-writes a .zddc into the new
subdir granting created_by + that email rwcda directly. Same form
operators write by hand; creator can edit it later to add others.
- Issued / Received: server-enforced WORM split. Cascade grants
inherited from above the WORM folder are masked to r only; grants
placed at-or-below the WORM folder retain r,c. Operators grant
write-once (cr) to the doc controller via an explicit .zddc at the
Issued/Received folder. Admins exempt — only escape hatch.
Browser polyfill (shared/zddc-source.js)
- HttpDirectoryHandle + HttpFileHandle implement the FS Access API
surface (values, getFileHandle, createWritable, removeEntry,
queryPermission/requestPermission) over zddc-server's listing JSON
and file API. Existing tools written against showDirectoryPicker
work unchanged.
- detectServerRoot() returns { handle, status }: tools auto-load on
HTTP, surface a clear "no permission to list" message on 403, and
fall back to the welcome screen on 0.
- classifier renames take the atomic POST move path on HTTP-backed
handles; mdedit and transmittal route reads/writes through the
polyfill so prior FS-API code paths cover both modes.
Tests
- zddc/internal/zddc/{cascade_mode,roles,special,acl}_test.go cover
delegated vs strict, role membership / shadowing / legacy fallback,
WORM split semantics, verb-set parser round-trip.
- zddc/internal/handler/fileapi_test.go now also covers role-based
vendor scenarios, WORM blocking vendor & doc controller writes,
explicit Issued .zddc unlocking the cr drop-box, admin bypass,
auto-ownership on mkdir, and strict-mode lockouts.
Docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md + zddc/README.md document the verb model, role
syntax, special-folder behaviors, cascade-mode flag, and full file
API surface. Federal-readiness gap analysis strikes AC-3(7) and
AC-6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The TLS configuration was using Go stdlib defaults — secure for typical
commercial use, but federal evaluators need an explicit cipher
allowlist they can map to a FIPS-validated implementation. Pin the
cipher and curve lists to NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2 § 3.3 conformant
values:
Ciphers (TLS 1.2):
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
Curves: X25519, P-256, P-384
MinVersion: TLS 1.2 (already set; 1.3 used when negotiated)
TLS 1.3 cipher selection is not operator-controllable in Go stdlib
(the runtime picks from a fixed AEAD-only set); all of those
already meet the federal bar so no change needed there.
Also adds HSTSMiddleware emitting `Strict-Transport-Security:
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` when zddc-server is itself
terminating TLS (ZDDC_TLS_CERT != none). Behind an upstream proxy
terminating TLS the proxy is responsible for HSTS, so the middleware
only wraps the chain when useTLS=true.
Test coverage:
* TLSConfig(none) returns nil + useTLS=false
* TLSConfig(selfsigned) sets the exact NIST allowlist
* Negative test asserting weak ciphers (CBC, RC4, 3DES, RSA-key-
exchange) are NOT in the list — guardrail against regressions
Federal-readiness gap analysis updated: this control is now partially
complete. OCSP stapling and CT-log inclusion remain on the list for
full DoD STIG conformance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an internal access-decision boundary that all handlers go through
instead of calling zddc.AllowedWithChain directly. Two implementations
ship:
* InternalDecider — wraps the existing zddc.AllowedWithChain. The
default. No new dependencies, identical semantics to the legacy
code path. ZDDC_OPA_URL=internal (or unset).
* HTTPDecider — POSTs the canonical OPA wire format
(POST /v1/data/zddc/access/allow with {"input": {...}}, response
{"result": true|false}) over HTTP, HTTPS, or a Unix-domain socket.
For federal customers running their own audited Rego policies
alongside zddc-server. ZDDC_OPA_URL=http(s)://… or unix:///….
External-mode failure semantics: unreachable / non-2xx / malformed
response → fail closed (deny) by default with a WARN log. Operators
who prefer availability over correctness flip with ZDDC_OPA_FAIL_OPEN=1.
The decider is constructed once at startup, plumbed through ACLMiddleware
into the request context. Handlers retrieve it via DeciderFromContext;
non-request callers (fs.ListDirectory, EnumerateProjects, enumerateAccess)
take it as an explicit parameter.
zddc.ZddcFile and zddc.ACLRules gain JSON tags so external Rego authors
get idiomatic input shape (acl.allow, admins, …) instead of Go field
names (ACL.Allow, Admins, …).
Test coverage:
* InternalDecider parity tests against zddc.AllowedWithChain (every
documented cascade scenario: empty chain, leaf-allow-wins, leaf-
deny-beats-parent, leaf-allows-what-parent-denies, deepest-match-
wins, etc.)
* HTTPDecider happy-path test (canonical wire format)
* Fail-closed / fail-open / malformed-response tests
Production binary size unchanged (no new deps; HTTP transport is
stdlib net/http). 11 ACL call sites migrated. End-to-end verified
against the worked-example layout in zddc/README.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add --access-log <path> (env ZDDC_ACCESS_LOG). When set, every access-
log record is written as a JSON line to the configured file in
addition to the existing slog.Default() stderr output. Empty (default)
keeps the prior behavior — stderr only.
Rotation via gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2:
100 MB per file, 10 backups, 90-day max age, gzip rotated files.
Operator usage (e.g. behind a Caddy/quadlet stack):
zddc-server --access-log /srv/.zddc.d/logs/access.log ...
Architecture:
AccessLogMiddleware now takes an optional *slog.Logger. main.go wires
it via setupAccessAuditLog() which builds a slog.JSONHandler over a
lumberjack rotator. Stderr emission stays via slog.Default(); the
audit logger gets the same fields in line-delimited JSON, the format
every standard log shipper (Vector, Loki, fluentbit, journalbeat)
parses natively.
Tests cover the audit logger receiving the same email/path/status
fields as the stderr stream.
ACLMiddleware now slog.Debug's the configured email-header name, the
observed value at that name, and the full r.Header map on every request.
Off at the default INFO log level; enable per-pod with ZDDC_LOG_LEVEL=debug.
Motivated by debugging the X-Auth-Request-Email passthrough chain — when
access logs show email=anonymous, /.admin/whoami is unreachable (the
admin gate requires a non-empty email, which is the chicken-and-egg).
The debug log line dumps headers without the gate, so an operator can
identify whichever header name the upstream proxy is actually setting
(X-Forwarded-User, X-Forwarded-Email, Remote-User, X-Authentik-Email,
etc.) and adjust ZDDC_EMAIL_HEADER accordingly.
The debug-level dump captures auth tokens and cookies along with
everything else; safe in dev clusters, not appropriate for production
unless the operator is comfortable with the trade-off. README documents
the trade-off in the Admin Debug Page section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ZDDC — Zero Day Document Control. A file-naming convention plus five
single-file HTML tools (archive, transmittal, classifier, mdedit,
landing) and an optional Go HTTP server (zddc-server) with ACL and a
virtual archive index. Self-contained, offline-capable, dependency-free.
See README.md for an overview, AGENTS.md and ARCHITECTURE.md for the
build/release/architecture detail, bootstrap/README.md for the
two-level deployment install pattern, and zddc/README.md for the
HTTP server.
