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20897fef6b feat(server): public landing page (root bypasses dir-level ACL)
GET / and GET /index.html previously enforced the root .zddc's
top-level acl: gate before serving the landing page. On a deployment
where only specific emails are allowed at root, anonymous (and
unauthorized) callers got 403 — they couldn't even see the project
picker that would tell them which projects were available to them.

Make the landing page public:
  - cmd/zddc-server: drop the AllowedWithChain gate from the
    apps.Serve("landing") branch; drop it from the IsDir branch when
    urlPath == "/".
  - handler/directory.go: matching bypass for ServeDirectory at the
    root path (covers Accept: application/json and the case where a
    real /index.html exists on disk).

Per-project ACL is preserved end-to-end:
  - fs.ListDirectory continues to filter sub-entries per email, so
    anonymous callers see only projects whose .zddc allows them.
  - Subdirectory requests still hit the ACL gate.

Regression test in handler/directory_test.go covers all four cases
(anonymous public, anonymous filters out private, admin sees both,
anonymous still 403 on private subdir). Full go test ./... passes.
2026-05-04 07:49:17 -05:00