When an HTML GET hits a directory that's the rows-dir of a registered
table — i.e. parent declares `tables: { <name>: ... }` with a valid
spec, OR the default-MDL fallback applies at archive/<party>/mdl/ —
ServeDirectory now 302s to <parent>/<name>.table.html so users land
on the table view instead of a bare browse listing of the row-yaml
files. JSON GETs on the same URL fall through unchanged so the table
client can still enumerate row files.
Detection reuses RecognizeTableRequest: synthesize the equivalent
.table.html URL from the directory request and let the existing
recognizer apply its operator-vs-default-vs-missing-spec rules. No
duplicated validation.
Updates main_test.go's TestDispatchSlashRouting to expect the new
behavior on archive/<party>/mdl/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a virtual-URL alias so the existing form-based .zddc editor is
reachable at the natural directory location (<dir>/.zddc.html) in
addition to the legacy /.profile/zddc/edit?path=<dir> entry. Both
flow through the same renderZddcEditor body — same template, same
gate, same form-posts-to-/.profile/zddc semantics.
Wiring:
- IsZddcEditorRequest(urlPath) reports whether the URL ends with
the .zddc.html leaf (case-fold not needed; .zddc is itself case-
sensitive on disk).
- ServeZddcEditorAtPath strips the leaf, resolves the parent dir,
asserts the dir exists, gates on hasAnyAdminScope, calls the
shared renderer.
- The dispatcher routes IsZddcEditorRequest URLs BEFORE the dot-
prefix segment guard (which would otherwise 404 the .zddc.html
leaf). The route is method-gated GET-only; mutations still go
through PUT/POST/DELETE on <dir>/.zddc via the file API.
Permission model unchanged from the /.profile entry: hasAnyAdminScope
gates visibility of the editor itself; CanEditZddc decides whether
the form is interactive or read-only at the requested directory.
Subtree admins can still inspect ancestor cascade ACLs (intended
since the cascade is what determines their authority).
Test (TestDispatchZddcEditorAtPath): root admin opens project /
working/ / deployment-root editors; non-admin and anonymous both
404; missing directory 404; trailing-segment-after-leaf 404.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
URL convention for directories under a project:
- <dir>/ (with trailing slash) → browse (the directory view; same
behaviour as today)
- <dir> (without trailing slash) → the canonical default tool for
that directory's context, served
inline (no 301 hop)
Tool mapping via the new apps.DefaultAppAt(root, dir):
- working/... → mdedit
- staging/... → transmittal
- archive/ → archive
- archive/<party>/ → archive
- archive/<party>/incoming|received|issued/... → archive
- archive/<party>/mdl/... → tables (the per-party MDL grid editor)
Directories outside the canonical layout (project root, scratch
folders) keep the legacy 301-to-trailing-slash redirect since no
default tool fits.
This generalises and replaces the bespoke
"GET archive/<party>/mdl/ → 302 mdl.table.html" redirect added in PR4.
The new dispatcher rule serves the table app inline at the bare-mdl
URL by routing through RecognizeTableRequest with the canonical
.table.html suffix appended; relative fetches resolve identically
because both URLs share the same parent directory.
Tests: TestDefaultAppAt covers all canonical positions plus
case-fold and out-of-tree edges. TestDispatchSlashRouting (replacing
the now-obsolete TestDispatchMdlRedirect) verifies the slash-vs-no-
slash distinction at every canonical folder + non-canonical
fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address two follow-ups from the security review of feat/zddc-inherit-directive:
1. file.go's Inherit docstring previously claimed "the internal decider
treats it as inherit:true and emits a warning at evaluation time" —
the decider does the first part but the warning was never wired up.
Strike the over-promise; point operators at the cascade tracer
(`/.profile/effective-policy`) which surfaces both `cascade_mode`
and `chain.visible_start` so a fenced configuration that's being
ignored under strict mode is visible.
2. AllowedAtLevel hardcodes ModeDelegated. Safe today (1-level
synthetic chain, no ancestors) but a footgun if anyone migrates
the shim to a real PolicyChain later. Add a `// Deprecated:`
marker pointing at GrantedVerbsAtLevel for fence-aware paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a new "The inherit: directive" subsection in zddc/README.md
under "Access control: the .zddc cascade" describing the directive's
purpose (vendor-folder reset, regulated subtrees), the four behaviour
points (grants, roles, admins, WORM), the strict-mode refusal under
NIST AC-6, and the tracer's visibility. Cross-link from the "How a
request is evaluated" walkthrough so a reader who's looking up the
core walk can find the fence behaviour without having to scan further.
Update the "Patterns that look secure but aren't" trap #1 (same-level
allow + deny "*@company.com") to recommend inherit: false as the
preferred fix, with a worked-example .zddc snippet alongside the
broken one. The two-level gate-and-reallow pattern remains as a
fallback for federal-track deployments where inherit: is refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cascade tracer's JSON response now carries:
- Top-level `cascade_mode` (string): the active mode (delegated /
strict). Helps reviewers correlate the visible_start with the mode.
- Top-level `chain.visible_start` (int): chain.VisibleStart(leaf, mode)
— the lowest level whose grants the leaf can see, accounting for any
inherit:false fence in delegated mode (always 0 in strict mode).
- Per-level `inherit` (*bool, omitempty): the level's explicit inherit
value, nil when absent. A reviewer can scan the levels and see which
one fences ancestors.
The level's `exists` flag now also fires for `permissions:` and
`inherit:` entries (previously it only checked Allow/Deny/Admins),
so the response correctly reflects modern .zddc files that use the
permissions map.
Test: TestServeProfileEffectivePolicy_InheritFence builds a vendor-
folder layout, asks the tracer about a my-company user, confirms
decision=false, visible_start=1 (fence at /Vendor/), leaf.Inherit=
&false, root.Inherit=nil.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A .zddc may now declare `acl.inherit: false` to fence off ancestor
grants and roles from the descendant subtree — the "complete reset
plus add back" pattern operators want for vendor folders and other
narrowly-scoped subtrees. The cascade walker honors the deepest fence
in [0, toIdx] when evaluating any level at-or-below it, both for
GrantedVerbsAtLevel/EffectiveVerbsRange and for role lookup
(RoleMembers / lookupRoleMembers).
Federal/strict cascade mode IGNORES the fence — required by
NIST AC-6 ("ancestor deny is absolute; no leaf-level override"). So
inherit:false has no effect under strict mode and ancestor grants
remain visible. Operators running the federal Rego preset get the
same behaviour from external policy enforcement.
API surface: ACLRules.Inherit (*bool, nil = unset = inherit-true);
ACLRules.InheritsAncestors() bool; PolicyChain.VisibleStart(toIdx,
mode) int. The mode parameter is now threaded through
GrantedVerbsAtLevel, MatchesPrincipal, MatchingPrincipals,
RoleMembers, and lookupRoleMembers so role resolution is fence-aware.
Tests:
- file_test.go: parser round-trip for absent / true / false inherit
- inherit_test.go: VisibleStart (no fence, fence clamps, nested fences,
strict-mode override), EffectiveVerbs (fence hides ancestor grants,
strict-mode keeps them), RoleMembers (ancestor roles hidden by fence,
local redefinition still works)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three pieces wire the per-party Master Deliverables List as the default
view at archive/<party>/mdl/:
1. **Dispatcher redirect.** GET (and HEAD) on
<project>/archive/<party>/mdl/ (case-fold on archive and mdl) now
302 → <project>/archive/<party>/mdl.table.html. Non-archive paths
and deeper mdl/ paths fall through unchanged.
2. **Default-spec fallback in RecognizeTableRequest.** When a request
matches archive/<party>/mdl.table.html and no operator-supplied
tables: { mdl: ... } declaration covers it, the handler returns a
recognised request anyway. Operator declarations still win — and a
typo'd declaration pointing at a missing file yields 404 (not a
silent fallback).
3. **Static-file fallback for the spec yaml.** GET archive/<party>/
mdl.table.yaml and archive/<party>/mdl.form.yaml return embedded
default bytes (default-mdl.{table,form}.yaml in the handler package)
when no operator file exists at that path. Operator files always
win because the dispatcher's os.Stat finds them before reaching the
IsDefaultMdlSpec branch.
The defaults use ZDDC vocabulary: tracking, title, discipline, type,
plannedRevision, plannedDate, status (DFT/IFR/IFA/IFC/AFC/AB), owner,
notes. Operators override per-party by writing
archive/<party>/{mdl.table.yaml,mdl.form.yaml} and a tables: { mdl: ... }
entry in the party's .zddc.
Tests:
- 4 dispatcher redirect cases (success, case-fold mdl, case-fold archive,
deeper-path skip, non-archive skip)
- 6 tablehandler cases (default fires at archive/<party>/, operator
override wins, scope check, embedded yaml served, operator yaml wins,
scope check on yaml fallback)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ListDirectory now appends a synthetic <viewer-email>/ entry when the
listed path is exactly <project>/working/ (depth 2, case-fold) and no
real directory there matches the viewer's email under any case.
The entry has IsDir=true and a new Virtual=true flag on
listing.FileInfo (omitempty in JSON so existing clients that don't
know the field continue to render it as a regular folder). A first
write to that path materialises a real folder via the existing
auto-own pipeline (EnsureCanonicalAncestors → WriteAutoOwnZddc),
after which subsequent listings drop the synthetic entry naturally.
Anonymous viewers, listings outside working/, and listings inside a
deeper working/ subdirectory all skip the synthetic entry.
Six tests cover: appears-when-missing, suppressed-when-real-exists
(case-fold), anonymous-no-entry, staging/-no-entry, deep-working-no-
entry, and pre-existing-PascalCase-Working/ still triggers it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a folder is created under <project>/staging/ whose name parses as a
ZDDC transmittal folder (YYYY-MM-DD_<tracking> (<status>) - <title>) and
whose tracking number contains -TRN- or -SUB-, also create the same-
named folder under <project>/working/ as a drafting space for staff.
The mirror is one-way and one-shot: created at staging-mkdir time only.
Renames and deletions of either side are not propagated. The
transmittal client orchestrates cleanup at issue time (move files to
archive/<recipient>/issued/, then delete both staging and working
siblings) — the server stays out of that decision.
-MDL- tracking deliberately skips the mirror; MDL deliverables live in
archive/<party>/mdl/ rows, not via the working↔staging pairing.
Implementation: mirrorStagingToWorking() in fileapi.go, called after a
successful serveFileMkdir. EnsureCanonicalAncestors handles working/'s
own auto-own .zddc; the mirror folder gets its own creator-grant on top.
Six new tests cover -TRN-/-SUB- mirror, -MDL- skip, non-transmittal
name skip, deep-path skip, and idempotency over a pre-existing sibling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New helper pair:
- ResolveCanonicalPath(fsRoot, target) — case-fold path resolution, no side effects
- EnsureCanonicalAncestors(fsRoot, target, email…) — case-fold + MkdirAll + auto-own .zddc seeding
For each canonical position along the requested path the helpers
substitute on-disk casing (so /Project/working/foo lands in an existing
Working/ rather than a new sibling) and materialise missing
working/staging/archive/<party>/{mdl,incoming,received,issued}/ folders.
working/, staging/, and archive/<party>/incoming/ get a creator-owned
.zddc seeded automatically; received/, issued/, and mdl/ are created
without auto-own (WORM and data-store concerns respectively).
reviewing/ is rejected — purely virtual, never on disk.
Wired into the file API:
- serveFilePut — resolve before auth, ensure after auth
- serveFileMkdir — resolve before auth, ensure after auth, with
two auto-own checks (target-is-canonical OR
parent-is-canonical)
- serveFileMove (POST) — resolve src+dst, ensure dst before rename so
a move from working/<draft> →
archive/<recipient>/issued/<draft> creates
the per-party folders on the way in
7 new unit tests in zddc/internal/zddc/ensure_test.go cover lazy
creation, case-fold reuse, per-party incoming auto-own, WORM no-auto-own,
empty-principal skip, reviewing rejection, and traversal rejection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The transmittal-folder grammar was duplicated as a private regex inside
the archive package. Replace the local regex with calls to the shared
parser in zddc/internal/zddc/folder.go so the grammar lives in one
place and the upcoming staging→working mirror logic can reuse it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
BREAKING CHANGE. Project-level Issued/Received/Incoming folders no
longer carry special semantics. WORM enforcement and auto-ownership
move to the per-party canonical layout:
- WORM mask now triggers on archive/<party>/received/ and
archive/<party>/issued/ (any case, any party)
- Auto-own .zddc writes on first mkdir under working/, staging/,
or archive/<party>/incoming/ (any case)
Predicate API:
- IsAutoOwnPath(parentDir, fsRoot) — replaces IsAutoOwnParent(name)
- IsWormPath(requestPath) — same name, new pattern
- WormFolderLevelIndex unchanged signature, new pattern
Legacy SpecialFolderNames / AutoOwnFolderNames / WormFolderNames /
IsAutoOwnParent are deleted (no Deprecated: stubs — early-development
project, no back-compat to preserve).
Tool availability (apps/availability.go) is case-fold throughout:
- mdedit: descendants of working/
- transmittal: descendants of staging/
- classifier: descendants of working/, staging/, or
archive/<party>/incoming/
Working/, WORKING/, working/ all match identically.
Test fixtures rewritten:
- special_test.go: covers IsAutoOwnPath / IsWormPath /
WormFolderLevelIndex / ResolveCanonical / canonical lists
- availability_test.go: per-party rules, case-fold scenarios
- fileapi_test.go: rolePermissionsTestSetup now seeds
Project-X/archive/Acme/{incoming,issued,received}/ rather than
Vendor/{Incoming,Issued,Received}/ at the project root
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pure refactor. The mkdir post-hook in handler/fileapi.go duplicated
zddc-package types; lifting the body into the package itself lets the
upcoming EnsureCanonicalAncestors helper share it without re-exposing
the file API's internals.
No behaviour change. The grant shape (creator email → rwcda + CreatedBy
audit field) and the atomic-write path through zddc.WriteFile are
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce the lowercase canonical folder model that the new auto-create
feature will key off:
- ProjectRootFolders = [archive, working, staging, reviewing]
- PartyFolders = [mdl, incoming, received, issued]
- AutoOwnCanonicalNames = [working, staging, incoming]
- VirtualOnlyCanonicalNames = [reviewing]
ResolveCanonical(parentDir, logical) does a case-fold lookup against
os.ReadDir(parentDir) so a manually-created Working/ is reused rather
than shadowed by a new working/ sibling.
Pure addition. The existing SpecialFolderNames / AutoOwnFolderNames /
WormFolderNames are kept (now Deprecated:) so dependent packages keep
compiling until the predicate rewrite lands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extracts the YYYY-MM-DD_<tracking> (<status>) - <title> grammar into a
reusable parser in the zddc package, and exposes a tracking-type
predicate for -TRN- / -SUB- (case-fold). The transmittal-folder regex
was previously only inside archive/index.go where it captured just the
date; the new ParseTransmittalFolder also returns tracking, status, and
title so handlers can recognise transmittal envelopes for upcoming
staging↔working mirror logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The .archive virtual prefix is now project-scoped at exactly one URL
depth: any /<project>/<sub>/.../.archive/... gets a 301 to the
canonical /<project>/.archive/.... The dispatcher does this before
calling the handler; query strings are preserved (the browser handles
the fragment automatically). .archive is also GET/HEAD-only — anything
else returns 405 with Allow: GET, HEAD, ahead of the file API.
Why: offline-built HTML files reference siblings as
"../.archive/<tracking>.html" from arbitrary depths. All of those refs
should converge on a single stable URL per (project, tracking) so
external links and bookmarks don't fork by entry point.
Permissions now follow the resolved file, not .archive itself.
.archive is a virtual surface — it has no on-disk directory and no
.zddc of its own, so gating it as if it did is wrong. Two gates only:
- Resolve: only the per-target file's ACL chain decides. A user
explicitly allowed at one transmittal folder but denied at the
project root can still fetch tracking numbers that resolve there.
Per-target denial returns 404 (not 403) so existence doesn't leak.
- Listing: filter entries by per-target ACL. If the project bucket
has zero indexed entries → 404 (unknown / empty project, indistinguishable
from a probe). If the bucket is non-empty but the caller can read
no entries → 403 (existence-leak guard: don't confirm an inaccessible
project's archive exists). Otherwise → 200 with the filtered subset.
The listing endpoint is now content-negotiated like ServeDirectory:
Accept: text/html serves the embedded `browse` SPA bytes (with the
embedded ETag and X-ZDDC-Source: embedded:browse); Accept:
application/json returns the JSON entry array (with content-hash ETag
and 304 short-circuit). Vary: Accept set on both. The browse SPA's
auto-detect path-fetch then renders the archive entries as a sortable,
filterable flat list at /<project>/.archive/.
ServeArchive's signature is now (cfg, idx, w, r, project, filename) —
the dispatcher hands the normalized project string in directly, so
projectFromContextPath is gone. Old behavior was to derive project
from contextPath inside the handler; with the upstream redirect that's
redundant and the handler's preconditions are simpler.
Tests: archivehandler_test.go rewritten around the new semantics;
added per-target-only resolve, project-root-deny + per-target-allow
rescue, listing 403/404 distinction, JSON/HTML content-negotiation,
and conditional GET. main_test.go gains TestDispatchArchiveRedirect
(deep paths, query preservation, already-canonical no-op) and
TestDispatchArchiveMethodGate (PUT/POST/DELETE → 405).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fsnotify watcher only sees events the local kernel generates, so on
SMB/CIFS-backed roots (Azure Files) writes from any other client are
invisible — the archive index would silently miss them until pod
restart. Add two backstops:
1. Periodic full re-walk via Index.Rebuild on a configurable interval
(--archive-rescan-interval / ZDDC_ARCHIVE_RESCAN_INTERVAL, default
60s, 0 to disable). Atomically swaps ByProject under the existing
RWMutex; concurrent reads stay safe.
2. Admin-only POST /.profile/reindex that triggers an immediate rebuild
and returns {duration_ms, project_count, tracking_count}, for the
"I just dropped 50 files and don't want to wait" case. Gated by
IsAdmin with the same 404-on-non-admin pattern as the other admin
sub-resources.
Tests: TestRebuild_PicksUpAddsAndDrops covers add+drop semantics and
returned counts; TestServeProfileReindexPOST covers the happy admin
path; matrix entries cover the gate (anonymous/non-admin → 404, admin
GET → 405 method-not-allowed since the route is POST-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refreshes //go:embed bytes off fe28a73. Dev image now ships the new
tables renderer (handler-local embed at handler/tables.html) plus
build-label refresh on the six cascade-served tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolved `.archive/<tracking>.html` URLs now serve the target file's
bytes inline via http.ServeFile with Cache-Control: no-cache, replacing
the previous 302 redirect to the per-transmittal URL.
Why: external links like `.archive/<tracking>.html#section` are meant
to track the latest revision. A redirect exposes the snapshot URL — any
forwarded link then pins to that snapshot instead of "latest." Serving
in-place keeps the `.archive/` URL stable as the resolver's "current"
target moves over time.
Cache-Control: no-cache is intentional. Each load revalidates against
the on-disk file's Last-Modified/ETag, so when a new revision lands the
resolver picks it and the browser refetches transparently.
ACL is unchanged: enforced on both the `.archive` context directory and
the resolved target file (per-target denial returns 404, not 403, to
avoid disclosing that a tracking number exists in a hidden subtree).
archivehandler_test.go status expectations updated 302 → 200; fixture
bodies adjusted for body-content verification of the in-place serve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tables is the eighth HTML tool: a read-only tabular view over a
directory of YAML files declared via `tables:` in `.zddc`. Anchor use
case is the Master Deliverables List, where each row is one
`<tracking>.yaml` under `Archive/<Party>/MDL/`. Rows click through to
the existing form renderer for editing.
Schema (zddc/internal/zddc/file.go)
- New `Tables map[string]string` on ZddcFile. Map key becomes the URL
stem (`tables[MDL]` → `<dir>/MDL.table.html`); the value is a path
relative to the .zddc pointing at a `*.table.yaml` spec describing
columns + the rows directory. No upward cascade in v1 — each
directory hosting a table declares it directly.
Server handler (zddc/internal/handler/tablehandler.go)
- `RecognizeTableRequest` matches GET `/<dir>/<name>.table.html`
against the cascade's `tables:` declarations. Dispatch routes
table requests before the form-system intercept.
- `ServeTable` ACL-gates with `policy.ActionRead` and serves the
embedded `tables.html` template; client walks the directory itself
via the listing JSON or FS Access API.
- tables.html embedded via //go:embed — same pattern as form.html.
Frontend (tables/)
- Vanilla JS: app/context/util/filters/sort/render/main modules.
- Reads spec + row YAML files via window.zddc.source (HTTP polyfill
or local FS handle); js-yaml 4.1.0 vendored in shared/vendor for
client-side parsing.
- Sample fixtures under tables/sample/ for local testing.
Build + CI
- Lockstep build registers tables alongside the other 7 tools (HTML
output, embed mirror, versions.txt, release-output, tags).
- Playwright project added; `npx playwright test --project=tables`
is part of `npm test`.
Drive-by: rename mdedit Playwright selectors `#select-directory` →
`#addDirectoryBtn` to fix three pre-existing failing tests.
Drive-by: ignore locally-built `zddc/zddc-server` binary so it doesn't
get accidentally staged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refreshes the //go:embed bytes off 3115e38. Dev image (ZDDC_REF=main)
now ships the file API and verb-based RBAC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the binary acl.allow/deny model with five permission verbs
(r/w/c/d/a) and first-class roles, and adds an authenticated file API
(PUT/DELETE/POST move/mkdir) so the HTML tools can edit-in-place over
HTTP. Closes the AC-3(7) and AC-6 federal-readiness gaps.
File API (zddc/internal/handler/fileapi.go)
- PUT <new> → action c
- PUT <existing> → action w
- PUT <.zddc> → action a (CanEditZddc strict-ancestor rule)
- DELETE → action d
- POST mkdir → action c (auto-writes creator-owned .zddc when the
parent is Incoming/Working/Staging)
- POST move → action w on src + c on dst, atomic via os.Rename
- Optional If-Match for optimistic concurrency, --max-write-bytes cap,
audit log emits a structured file_write event per operation.
Permission model (zddc/internal/zddc/{acl,file,roles,cascade_mode}.go)
- acl.permissions: { principal → verb-set } map; principals are email
patterns or role names. Empty verb set is an explicit deny.
- roles: { name → members } definitions, available at the level they
declare and all descendants. Closer-to-leaf shadows ancestor.
- Legacy acl.allow/deny still work; they fold into permissions at
parse time (allow → "rwcd", deny → "").
- Cascade walks leaf→root; first level with any matching entry wins;
the union of matching verb sets at that level decides.
- --cascade-mode=strict adds a root→leaf ancestor-deny pre-pass so an
ancestor explicit-deny is absolute (NIST AC-6). Default delegated
preserves the existing commercial behavior.
Special folders (zddc/internal/zddc/special.go)
- Incoming / Working / Staging: mkdir auto-writes a .zddc into the new
subdir granting created_by + that email rwcda directly. Same form
operators write by hand; creator can edit it later to add others.
- Issued / Received: server-enforced WORM split. Cascade grants
inherited from above the WORM folder are masked to r only; grants
placed at-or-below the WORM folder retain r,c. Operators grant
write-once (cr) to the doc controller via an explicit .zddc at the
Issued/Received folder. Admins exempt — only escape hatch.
Browser polyfill (shared/zddc-source.js)
- HttpDirectoryHandle + HttpFileHandle implement the FS Access API
surface (values, getFileHandle, createWritable, removeEntry,
queryPermission/requestPermission) over zddc-server's listing JSON
and file API. Existing tools written against showDirectoryPicker
work unchanged.
- detectServerRoot() returns { handle, status }: tools auto-load on
HTTP, surface a clear "no permission to list" message on 403, and
fall back to the welcome screen on 0.
- classifier renames take the atomic POST move path on HTTP-backed
handles; mdedit and transmittal route reads/writes through the
polyfill so prior FS-API code paths cover both modes.
Tests
- zddc/internal/zddc/{cascade_mode,roles,special,acl}_test.go cover
delegated vs strict, role membership / shadowing / legacy fallback,
WORM split semantics, verb-set parser round-trip.
- zddc/internal/handler/fileapi_test.go now also covers role-based
vendor scenarios, WORM blocking vendor & doc controller writes,
explicit Issued .zddc unlocking the cr drop-box, admin bypass,
auto-ownership on mkdir, and strict-mode lockouts.
Docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md + zddc/README.md document the verb model, role
syntax, special-folder behaviors, cascade-mode flag, and full file
API surface. Federal-readiness gap analysis strikes AC-3(7) and
AC-6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a second way to configure the apps signing pubkey alongside the
existing --apps-pubkey / ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (path-to-PEM-file) form: an
inline PEM block under apps_pubkey: in the root .zddc file. Resolution
order:
1. --apps-pubkey / ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (path) ← env/flag wins
2. apps_pubkey: inline PEM in root .zddc ← second
3. nothing ← URL fetches refused
Honored only at the root .zddc — same trust-anchor treatment as the
existing admins: field. Subtree write authority cannot re-anchor
trust because subtree apps_pubkey: entries are ignored. (Same
unmarshal pattern as the rest of ZddcFile; the root-only enforcement
is in setupApps where we explicitly read filepath.Join(cfg.Root,
".zddc") rather than walking a chain.)
Why offer both: env/flag fits k8s + systemd deployment shapes where
the operator already manages a config volume and prefers env-based
plumbing. Inline-in-.zddc fits the "everything in one config file"
mental model and matches how operators already think about admins:
and acl:. Either ships a working URL-fetch-verify story; the choice
is operator preference.
Logged differently per source so operators can grep for which path
populated the key:
apps signing pubkey loaded source=env/flag path=/path/to/pubkey.pem
apps signing pubkey loaded source="root .zddc apps_pubkey"
Smoke-tested end-to-end: a root .zddc with inline apps_pubkey: PEM
block + apps: archive: <upstream-URL> + ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY unset —
the server logs "loaded source=root .zddc apps_pubkey" at startup,
fetches the URL, verifies the .sig against the inline key, caches.
Tampering still rejects; missing .sig still rejects; everything that
worked yesterday still works.
Docs: env-var tables in zddc/README.md and AGENTS.md note the
inline alternative; the federal-readiness gap analysis subsection
on code signing now lists both paths in its resolution order; the
release-page "Verify your downloads" section mentions both for
operators.
Production binary unchanged at ~13 MB. All 11 Go test packages green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two interlocking pieces shipped together:
1. Strict Ed25519 signature verification on URL-fetched apps artifacts.
Every URL the apps cascade resolves must publish a corresponding
<url>.sig (raw 64-byte Ed25519 signature). The fetcher rejects on
any failure (sig 404, transport error, wrong key, tampered body)
and the resolver falls back to the embedded copy.
The trusted public key is OPERATOR-CONFIGURED via --apps-pubkey /
ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY (PEM file path). No baked-in default — same posture
as TLS certificates. Operators using zddc.varasys.io's canonical
channels download pubkey.pem from there and configure the local
path. Operators with their own signing infrastructure pass their
own public key.
Build pipeline (./build) gains sign_release_artifacts: walks
dist/release-output/ after promote and produces an Ed25519 .sig
alongside every real file. ZDDC_SIGNING_KEY=~/.config/zddc-signing/
key.pem (mode 0600). Symlinks skip — the .sig at the symlink
target is what counts.
Test coverage: parse-PEM round-trip, malformed/wrong-type PEM
rejection, valid-signature accept, tampered-body reject, wrong-key
reject, malformed-signature reject, end-to-end fetch+sign+verify,
fetch-rejects-tampered, fetch-rejects-missing-sig, fetch-rejects-
wrong-key. Existing fetch tests updated to use signed-fixture
helpers.
2. Dev Helm chart mounts production data READ-ONLY and layers an
OverlayFS writable scratch on top. Prod data is the lowerdir;
dev's writes (form submissions, archive index state, .zddc edits)
land in upperdir; main container sees the merged read-write view
at $ZDDC_ROOT. Setup runs in a privileged init container; main
container runs unprivileged. Solves the dev-replica-on-shared-
dataset problem at the filesystem layer with no zddc-server code
change.
Docs: env-var tables in zddc/README.md and AGENTS.md gain a
ZDDC_APPS_PUBKEY row. The Federal-readiness gap analysis "Code-signed
apps: URL fetches" subsection is rewritten as "what's currently in
place" instead of "what would need to be added," with a forward
pointer to per-entry signed_by: (multi-key) and Sigstore as the
federally-acceptable evolution.
The website "Verify your downloads" section + the embedded pubkey
gone — but the website needs separate updates landing in zddc-website
to publish pubkey.pem and add the verify section. Pending in that
repo's commit.
Production binary unchanged at 13.1 MB. All 11 Go test packages green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two doc/website improvements:
build:341 build_releases_index() — new "Build your apps: block" section
between the pinning narrative and the channels explainer. Per-app
dropdowns (one each for archive/transmittal/classifier/mdedit/landing),
a live-updating YAML textarea, and a Copy button. The dropdowns clone
their options from the existing #version-picker (channels at top,
pinned versions below) so we don't duplicate version data into JS —
the picker is the single source of truth for "what versions exist."
~80 lines of HTML+JS added; no SHA-256 anywhere (per user direction
that code signing is the future supply-chain answer, not hash pinning).
zddc/README.md § Federal-readiness gap analysis — promoted four items
that previously were one-line bullets to per-item subsections so a
future implementor doesn't have to redo the design conversation:
- FIPS-validated cryptography (NIST SC-13): captures cgo + OpenSSL
implications, the platform-matrix reality, and the parallel
zddc-server-fips build target architecture (linux-amd64 only,
RHEL/UBI base, validated OpenSSL on host).
- Authenticated proxy↔server channel (NIST IA-3): mTLS vs JWT
trade-offs spelled out. Recommended: JWT first; mTLS available
for deployments that already operate a private CA.
- Policy export for change control (NIST CM-3): zddc-server policy
export subcommand emitting every directory's resolved ACL in
JSON / Markdown / CSV. Reuses zddc.ScanZddcFiles +
zddc.EffectivePolicy + zddc.MatchesPattern.
- Code-signed apps: URL fetches (NIST SI-7): replaces SHA-256
pinning (operator hash-tracking burden) with code signing
(operator trusts a public key once). Three-part implementation
(build pipeline signs, public key on website, verifier in
apps/fetch.go).
The bullet list at the top of the gap analysis stays as a one-line
index pointing at the subsections.
Items #6 (ABAC roles) and #7 (logs: block in root .zddc) stay as
bullets — commercial-deployment features, not federal-track.
No code changes to the binary. No tests touched. ~280 lines added
across the two files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ship a second parity-tested Rego policy that flips the cascade's
leaf-allow-overrides-parent-deny rule for NIST AC-6 conformance.
Standard cascade (existing access.rego, mirrors internal Go evaluator):
Bottom-up walk; first explicit match wins; deny-first within a level.
A leaf-level allow CAN override an ancestor's deny. This is the
cascade's intentional delegation property — a project-owner who
re-allows a previously-denied collaborator works as expected.
Federal mode (new access_federal.rego):
Any deny anywhere along the chain is absolute. An allow only matters
if no level (any depth) has denied the same email. Required by
NIST AC-6 default expectations: a central admin's deny at the root
must be unbypassable by a tenant who controls a subtree's .zddc.
Operators run real OPA with this Rego and point ZDDC_OPA_URL at it;
the internal Go evaluator stays on the commercial cascade. The
toggle is "which policy does your OPA evaluate," not a knob inside
zddc-server.
Surfaced via --print-rego flag:
zddc-server --print-rego # standard (default)
zddc-server --print-rego=standard # same
zddc-server --print-rego=federal # AC-6 strict variant
Parity test (federal_parity_test.go) compiles both Regos and asserts:
* They AGREE on every cascade scenario where no ancestor-deny
intersects a leaf-allow (most cases).
* They DISAGREE — by design — on the three scenarios where the
AC-6 rule differs:
- "leaf allows what parent denied" → standard allows, federal denies
- "deep leaf re-allows after middle deny" → same
- "glob deny at root + specific allow at leaf" → same
Cross-checks the divergence flag explicitly so any future change that
accidentally collapses the two policies fails the test.
Closes the AC-6 row of the federal-readiness gap analysis (now marked
"partially complete" in zddc/README.md — the full bullet would be a
built-in --policy-mode=federal toggle that also flips the in-process
Go evaluator).
Production binary unchanged at 13.1 MB (Rego files embedded as bytes;
OPA library remains test-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eliminates the manual cascade-trace ritual when debugging "why can't
alice see /Project-X" reports. New endpoint returns the resolved
policy chain plus the active decider's verdict in JSON:
GET /.profile/effective-policy?path=/Project-X/sub/&email=alice@…
Response shape:
{
"path": "/Project-X/sub/",
"email": "alice@…",
"decision": true,
"decider_kind": "*policy.InternalDecider",
"chain": {
"has_any_file": true,
"levels": [
{"index": 0, "zddc_path": "/.zddc", "exists": true,
"acl": {...}, "admins": [...],
"matches_email": false, "decision_at_level": "no_match"},
{"index": 1, "zddc_path": "/Project-X/.zddc", "exists": true,
"acl": {...}, "matches_email": true, "decision_at_level": "allow"}
]
}
}
Per-level email matching reuses the same MatchesPattern code the live
evaluator uses, so the trace can never disagree with the actual
verdict — and when ZDDC_OPA_URL points at an external OPA, the
decision goes through that OPA, making the endpoint a useful smoke
test for OPA wiring too.
Admin-only via the existing /.profile gate (404 to non-admins).
Required params; 400 if either is missing or path doesn't escape ROOT.
Test coverage:
* TestServeProfileGateMatrix: anonymous → 404, non-admin → 404,
admin without params → 400 (gate cleared, validator rejected)
* TestServeProfileEffectivePolicy: full payload-shape assertion
against a worked-example fixture (closed project where alice is
allow-listed but bob is not)
Also fixes pre-existing doc drift: README's "Admin Debug Page"
section referenced /.admin/whoami|config|logs but the actual code
mounts /.profile/* (the rename predates this PR; the doc was stale).
Closes the "/.admin/effective-policy debug endpoint" item from the
federal-readiness future-work list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous keyForURL stripped default ports (:443 for https, :80
for http) and omitted the scheme, so:
http://example.com/x.html ──┐
https://example.com/x.html ──┴──→ same cache entry (collision)
https://example.com/x.html ──┐
https://example.com:443/x.html ──┴──→ same cache entry
This was a defensible HTTP convention but a real correctness issue
on reverse-proxy stacks where http and https legitimately serve
different bytes for the same path, or where two upstreams share a
host but answer on different default ports.
New layout: <scheme>/<host>[:<port>]/<path>. Full origin tuple in
the key, no port stripping, scheme segregation. Examples:
https/zddc.varasys.io/releases/archive_stable.html
https/example.com:8443/x.html
http/example.com/y.html (distinct from https/example.com/y.html)
Operators retain the "ls _app/ to inspect what's cached" affordance
they relied on; they just see one extra directory layer (scheme
first, then host).
Tests:
* Updated TestKeyForURL to assert the new layout for every
previously-covered case
* New TestKeyForURL_NoCollisions explicitly asserts that the
dimensions previously collapsed (default-port↔bare, http↔https,
different non-default ports) now produce distinct keys
Doc references to the cache layout under <ZDDC_ROOT>/_app/ updated
in zddc/README.md (3 mentions).
NOTE: existing _app/ caches under the old layout will be ignored
on first request after upgrade — entries will be re-fetched and
written to the new path. Operators can `rm -rf <ZDDC_ROOT>/_app`
during the upgrade window if they prefer not to have orphans.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The TLS configuration was using Go stdlib defaults — secure for typical
commercial use, but federal evaluators need an explicit cipher
allowlist they can map to a FIPS-validated implementation. Pin the
cipher and curve lists to NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2 § 3.3 conformant
values:
Ciphers (TLS 1.2):
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
Curves: X25519, P-256, P-384
MinVersion: TLS 1.2 (already set; 1.3 used when negotiated)
TLS 1.3 cipher selection is not operator-controllable in Go stdlib
(the runtime picks from a fixed AEAD-only set); all of those
already meet the federal bar so no change needed there.
Also adds HSTSMiddleware emitting `Strict-Transport-Security:
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` when zddc-server is itself
terminating TLS (ZDDC_TLS_CERT != none). Behind an upstream proxy
terminating TLS the proxy is responsible for HSTS, so the middleware
only wraps the chain when useTLS=true.
Test coverage:
* TLSConfig(none) returns nil + useTLS=false
* TLSConfig(selfsigned) sets the exact NIST allowlist
* Negative test asserting weak ciphers (CBC, RC4, 3DES, RSA-key-
exchange) are NOT in the list — guardrail against regressions
Federal-readiness gap analysis updated: this control is now partially
complete. OCSP stapling and CT-log inclusion remain on the list for
full DoD STIG conformance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three docs aligned with the preceding three feature commits.
zddc/README.md
--------------
Major overhaul of the access-control narrative. The previous "three-
tier" example table was misleading: it claimed a project-level
allow-list "restricts" access under a parent wildcard, when actually
the cascade is additive (a non-team employee falls up to root and
matches *@company.com). Operators reading the old docs would build
deployments that looked locked-down but leaked across the company.
New sections under "Access control: the .zddc cascade":
* Step 1: starter .zddc — leads with the public-by-default warning
and the --insecure escape hatch
* How a request is evaluated — bottom-up walk with code citations
* Glob patterns — @-boundary rule
* When the cascade helps and when it fights you — the asymmetry
between adding strangers (easy) and excluding insiders (hard)
* Pick your layout — decision matrix for common shapes
* Worked example: paired open/closed projects + third-party archive
— full layout with trace table for two representative users
* Patterns that look secure but aren't — anti-patterns including
same-level allow+deny shadow, leaf-allow-doesn't-restrict,
apps:-as-UI-mount
* Trust model and invariants — auth boundary, subtree authority,
root-only escalation gate
* Trust boundary — network isolation requirement, anonymous
information disclosure on /, audit-log integrity
* Debugging permissions — manual cascade trace
* Directory visibility / Reserved hidden segments
* How to verify in 5 minutes — recipe with negative anti-pattern test
* Federal-readiness gap analysis — bulleted with NIST control refs
* External policy decider — OPA wire format, deployment shapes,
failure modes
* OPA decision cache — TTL semantics, knobs
* Reference Rego policy — --print-rego, parity test rationale
* Caching and ETags — content-hash story, why not server-side
* Future work
Plus env-var table updates for ZDDC_INSECURE, ZDDC_OPA_URL,
ZDDC_OPA_FAIL_OPEN, ZDDC_OPA_CACHE_TTL; CORS narrative reflects
default-empty.
ARCHITECTURE.md
---------------
New "Server security model" section between Form Renderer and CSS:
cooperating layers (auth / policy decider / cascade / tool-rooted
view / reserved prefixes / audit log), commercial-vs-federal trust
model side-by-side, why the tool-rooted view matters for third-party
containment.
AGENTS.md
---------
Two new env-var rows (ZDDC_OPA_URL, ZDDC_OPA_CACHE_TTL); ACL line
sharpened with cascade rules + cross-reference; ZDDC_CORS_ORIGIN
description updated for default-empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 enhancements to the policy decider, plus listing-level ETags
that benefit every deployment regardless of decider mode.
Reference Rego policy
---------------------
internal/policy/rego/access.rego mirrors InternalDecider's semantics
exactly — bottom-up walk, deny-first within a level, default-deny when
HasAnyFile=true, glob matching with @-boundary semantics (special-cased
bare "*" because OPA's glob.match treats empty delimiters
inconsistently for that pattern).
Embedded into the binary via go:embed; --print-rego dumps it to stdout
so federal customers standing up an external OPA can use it as a
parity-tested baseline:
zddc-server --print-rego > /etc/opa/policies/zddc-access.rego
Parity test runner
------------------
parity_test.go imports the OPA Go module as a TEST-ONLY dependency
(github.com/open-policy-agent/opa@v0.70.0). Every fixture from the
internal Go evaluator's test set runs through both implementations;
any divergence fails CI. The test-only import means production
binaries (built by `go build ./cmd/zddc-server`) stay OPA-free —
release-flag binary size unchanged at ~13 MB.
The parity test caught a real bug on first run: bare "*" patterns
didn't match through OPA's glob.match with empty delimiters. Fixed
in access.rego with a special-case rule. This is exactly the kind of
subtle drift the parity guard exists to catch.
External-mode decision cache
----------------------------
HTTPDecider is now wrapped in a cachingDecider with a default 1s TTL.
Bursty patterns like .archive listings (one OPA round-trip per entry
before, one per (email, decision-input) tuple per TTL window after)
amortize cleanly. Verified: 20 identical /D/ requests produce 1 OPA
hit with cache, 40 hits without (each listing makes 2 ACL queries).
ZDDC_OPA_CACHE_TTL knob (default 1s) lets operators tune. 0 disables.
1s matches the fsnotify watcher debounce window — staleness is
bounded the same way other policy-edit propagation already is.
Internal mode unchanged; the in-process Go evaluator is already
cheaper than a cache lookup would be.
Listing ETags
-------------
GET / (project list) and GET /<dir>/ (directory listing JSON) now
carry content-hash ETag + Cache-Control: private, max-age=0,
must-revalidate. SHA-256 of the rendered JSON, truncated to 16 hex
chars (64 bits — collision risk on a listing of any realistic size
is vanishingly small).
Server-side caching deliberately not added: it would require
mtime-based invalidation, and Azure Files SMB mounts (a common
deployment substrate) don't support fsnotify reliably. The
content-hash ETag delivers the bandwidth savings (304 on identical
fetches) without depending on watcher correctness — the hash is the
actual response, so it can't lie about staleness regardless of
underlying watcher behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an internal access-decision boundary that all handlers go through
instead of calling zddc.AllowedWithChain directly. Two implementations
ship:
* InternalDecider — wraps the existing zddc.AllowedWithChain. The
default. No new dependencies, identical semantics to the legacy
code path. ZDDC_OPA_URL=internal (or unset).
* HTTPDecider — POSTs the canonical OPA wire format
(POST /v1/data/zddc/access/allow with {"input": {...}}, response
{"result": true|false}) over HTTP, HTTPS, or a Unix-domain socket.
For federal customers running their own audited Rego policies
alongside zddc-server. ZDDC_OPA_URL=http(s)://… or unix:///….
External-mode failure semantics: unreachable / non-2xx / malformed
response → fail closed (deny) by default with a WARN log. Operators
who prefer availability over correctness flip with ZDDC_OPA_FAIL_OPEN=1.
The decider is constructed once at startup, plumbed through ACLMiddleware
into the request context. Handlers retrieve it via DeciderFromContext;
non-request callers (fs.ListDirectory, EnumerateProjects, enumerateAccess)
take it as an explicit parameter.
zddc.ZddcFile and zddc.ACLRules gain JSON tags so external Rego authors
get idiomatic input shape (acl.allow, admins, …) instead of Go field
names (ACL.Allow, Admins, …).
Test coverage:
* InternalDecider parity tests against zddc.AllowedWithChain (every
documented cascade scenario: empty chain, leaf-allow-wins, leaf-
deny-beats-parent, leaf-allows-what-parent-denies, deepest-match-
wins, etc.)
* HTTPDecider happy-path test (canonical wire format)
* Fail-closed / fail-open / malformed-response tests
Production binary size unchanged (no new deps; HTTP transport is
stdlib net/http). 11 ACL call sites migrated. End-to-end verified
against the worked-example layout in zddc/README.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two safe-by-default flips, both opt-out via explicit acknowledgement.
1. --insecure / ZDDC_INSECURE=1: zddc-server now refuses to start when
no <ZDDC_ROOT>/.zddc exists. With no .zddc anywhere in the chain,
AllowedWithChain falls through to "HasAnyFile=false → allow" and
the tree is publicly accessible to anonymous callers — almost never
what an operator wants on a fresh deployment, and previously a
silent footgun. The flag is the escape hatch for deliberately-
public archives (no .zddc anywhere by design).
2. ZDDC_CORS_ORIGIN now defaults to empty (CORS disabled) instead of
the canonical "https://zddc.varasys.io". The embedded-tools install
path serves tools and data same-origin, so the default never needed
to permit cross-origin XHRs from a third-party host. Every deployment
was implicitly trusting zddc.varasys.io to make authenticated XHRs
on behalf of every logged-in user; if that origin were ever
compromised, the blast radius extended to every customer server.
Operators who deliberately use the CDN-bootstrap pattern or self-
hosted tools at a different host now set the value explicitly.
Helm chart values updated accordingly: prod default is empty; dev
keeps localhost:8000 for tool-iteration workflows. Existing deployments
that depended on the old defaults will need to either set the value
explicitly or pass --insecure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The recent history rewrite (squash of 4 thrash CI commits) made the
chart's previous appVersion (0.0.16-beta-8df0def) reference a now-
dangling commit. The dev pipeline failed clone "remote ref not
found" until we re-bumped to a SHA in the new history.
Re-cut beta with the new HEAD parent (ae75855) so notify-chart-dev
rewrites the chart's appVersion to a SHA the BMCD dev pipeline can
actually fetch. Combined with the Dockerfile clone-via-fetch fix in
tnd-zddc-chart 86c5758 (handles bare SHAs), the dev pipeline should
build cleanly.
Two related operational improvements:
1. HTTP timeouts on http.Server (ReadHeaderTimeout 10s, ReadTimeout +
WriteTimeout 60s, IdleTimeout 120s). Caps slow-client connection
hold time; closes the slowloris vector. Listing + tool-HTML
responses complete in milliseconds even with gzip, so 60s is
generous for legit traffic.
2. --access-log defaults to <ZDDC_ROOT>/.zddc.d/logs/access-<host>.log
instead of stderr-only. The server auto-creates the parent tree
(mode 0750), so a fresh deployment gets an audit trail without
operator setup. Every JSON record carries a `host` field (from
os.Hostname) — multi-replica deployments share the .zddc.d/logs/
directory but write to per-host filenames, and downstream
aggregators can disambiguate via the host field.
Opt-out: --access-log= (explicit empty). Distinguishing "unset"
from "set to empty" follows the same pattern config.go already
uses for --cors-origin.
Live verification:
$ zddc-server -root /tmp/r -addr 127.0.0.1:8765 -tls-cert none -insecure-direct
$ curl http://127.0.0.1:8765/
$ ls /tmp/r/.zddc.d/logs/
access-bizon.log
$ tail -1 /tmp/r/.zddc.d/logs/access-bizon.log
{"time":...,"level":"INFO","msg":"access","host":"bizon",...,"email":"anonymous","method":"GET","path":"/","status":200,...}
$ zddc-server -root /tmp/r ... -access-log= # opt-out
$ ls /tmp/r/.zddc.d/ # empty: no logs/ created
Bake into the dev binary:
- ETag + max-age=0 on embedded HTML (304s on repeat loads)
- gzip compression middleware (~75% wire-size reduction)
- vendored jszip + docx-preview in archive/transmittal/classifier
- tee'd file-based access log via --access-log
Add --access-log <path> (env ZDDC_ACCESS_LOG). When set, every access-
log record is written as a JSON line to the configured file in
addition to the existing slog.Default() stderr output. Empty (default)
keeps the prior behavior — stderr only.
Rotation via gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2:
100 MB per file, 10 backups, 90-day max age, gzip rotated files.
Operator usage (e.g. behind a Caddy/quadlet stack):
zddc-server --access-log /srv/.zddc.d/logs/access.log ...
Architecture:
AccessLogMiddleware now takes an optional *slog.Logger. main.go wires
it via setupAccessAuditLog() which builds a slog.JSONHandler over a
lumberjack rotator. Stderr emission stays via slog.Default(); the
audit logger gets the same fields in line-delimited JSON, the format
every standard log shipper (Vector, Loki, fluentbit, journalbeat)
parses natively.
Tests cover the audit logger receiving the same email/path/status
fields as the stderr stream.
Add github.com/klauspost/compress/gzhttp wrapper around the request
handler. With MinSize(1024), responses ≥ 1 KB get gzip-encoded when
the client advertises Accept-Encoding: gzip; smaller bodies + 304
Not Modified pass through unchanged.
The wrapper auto-appends Vary: Accept-Encoding (compatible with the
existing Vary: Accept on directory.go's content-negotiated path).
Live-tested against zddc-server -root /tmp/empty:
GET / w/ Accept-Encoding: gzip → 20.9 KB compressed (was 80.9 KB
uncompressed). 74% reduction.
Decompresses cleanly back to the original bytes.
Helps every code path that bypasses Caddy: devshell pods, local dev
binaries, tests, anywhere zddc-server is hit directly. Production
behind Caddy already had compression at the proxy layer; this just
makes the Go server self-sufficient.
Tests in cmd/zddc-server/main_test.go cover:
- large body + Accept-Encoding → compressed + Vary header
- small body → not compressed (under MinSize)
- no Accept-Encoding header → plain bytes
The apps subsystem previously sent Cache-Control: public, max-age=300|3600,
must-revalidate but no ETag. With must-revalidate and no validator, the
browser cannot return 304 — it has to refetch the full body once max-age
expires. For mdedit that's 920 KB on every reload after an hour.
Add a content-addressed ETag (sha256 hex prefix, 32 chars) to:
- apps/handler.go's serveBody + serveEmbedded (both paths now emit ETag
+ handle If-None-Match short-circuit to 304)
- handler/directory.go's embedded:browse fallback (mirror behavior so
the bare-directory landing serves the same way)
Drop max-age to 0 with must-revalidate: every page load revalidates,
but a matching ETag returns 304 with empty body. Steady-state cost of
a reload drops from N KB to a few hundred bytes. When the binary is
redeployed, the ETag changes (content hash) and the next request
returns 200 with the new bytes.
Tests in apps/handler_test.go cover both paths:
- TestServer_Embedded_ConditionalGET: full GET, matching INM, stale INM
- TestEmbeddedETag_Stable: same bytes → same ETag, different → different
Live smoke (curl against zddc-server -root /tmp/empty):
GET / → 200, ETag set, body = 80919 bytes (landing.html)
GET / + INM:tag → 304 Not Modified, empty body
GET / and GET /index.html previously enforced the root .zddc's
top-level acl: gate before serving the landing page. On a deployment
where only specific emails are allowed at root, anonymous (and
unauthorized) callers got 403 — they couldn't even see the project
picker that would tell them which projects were available to them.
Make the landing page public:
- cmd/zddc-server: drop the AllowedWithChain gate from the
apps.Serve("landing") branch; drop it from the IsDir branch when
urlPath == "/".
- handler/directory.go: matching bypass for ServeDirectory at the
root path (covers Accept: application/json and the case where a
real /index.html exists on disk).
Per-project ACL is preserved end-to-end:
- fs.ListDirectory continues to filter sub-entries per email, so
anonymous callers see only projects whose .zddc allows them.
- Subdirectory requests still hit the ACL gate.
Regression test in handler/directory_test.go covers all four cases
(anonymous public, anonymous filters out private, admin sees both,
anonymous still 403 on private subdir). Full go test ./... passes.
Bake the standardized headers + archive bugfix + browse refactor
into the dev binary. Triggers notify-chart-dev → bumps tnd-zddc-chart
develop with appVersion=0.0.16-beta-<sha>.
