diff --git a/zddc/internal/policy/policy.go b/zddc/internal/policy/policy.go
index 66cf95d..8c9b751 100644
--- a/zddc/internal/policy/policy.go
+++ b/zddc/internal/policy/policy.go
@@ -243,11 +243,21 @@ func (d *InternalDecider) Allow(_ context.Context, input AllowInput) (bool, erro
 	// is a STANDING permission: a subtree admin (admins: cascade) or a
 	// holder of the `a` verb may edit the config of subtrees they
 	// administer WITHOUT elevating. This sits ABOVE the WORM clamp because
-	// config is not WORM-protected data — and it only ever grants VerbA,
-	// so it can never write/delete/create WORM *records* (those need
-	// W/C/D, which stay clamped and behind the elevated bypass above).
-	// Elevation is thus purely additive: it adds the WORM/destructive
-	// overrides, never gating config-edit you already have authority for.
+	// config is not WORM-protected data.
+	//
+	// Scope: this grants VerbA only, so no SINGLE decision here authorizes a
+	// WORM *record* write/delete/create (those need W/C/D, which stay clamped
+	// below, behind the elevated bypass above). It does NOT, however, make a
+	// WORM zone tamper-proof against its own policy owner: a config-editor who
+	// administers a WORM directory may edit that directory's .zddc — including
+	// relaxing or (via inherit:false) dropping its `worm:` marker — after
+	// which ordinary writes to that subtree are no longer clamped. That
+	// two-step demotion is intended (owning a subtree's policy includes its
+	// worm: declaration) and is access-logged/transparent: WORM is therefore
+	// tamper-EVIDENT to its config owner, not tamper-PROOF. A deployment that
+	// needs the marker immutable except under elevation should gate worm:
+	// relaxation behind IsActiveAdmin. The edit-then-write composition is
+	// pinned in standing_config_test.go (TestStandingConfigEdit_WormDemotionIsTwoStep).
 	if verb == zddc.VerbA && zddc.IsConfigEditor(chain, email) {
 		return true, nil
 	}
diff --git a/zddc/internal/policy/standing_config_test.go b/zddc/internal/policy/standing_config_test.go
index 280464e..adb608e 100644
--- a/zddc/internal/policy/standing_config_test.go
+++ b/zddc/internal/policy/standing_config_test.go
@@ -72,3 +72,47 @@ func TestStandingConfigEdit(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// TestStandingConfigEdit_WormDemotionIsTwoStep documents the (intended)
+// composition that a single-action view of the decider hides: a config-editor
+// who administers a WORM zone cannot write a WORM record directly, but CAN
+// demote the zone by editing its own .zddc, after which an ordinary write is
+// no longer clamped. WORM is thus tamper-evident to its policy owner, not
+// tamper-proof. Pinned so the behavior is an explicit, tested decision — if a
+// deployment ever needs WORM markers immutable except under elevation, this is
+// the test that must change alongside gating worm: relaxation behind
+// IsActiveAdmin in policy.InternalDecider.Allow.
+func TestStandingConfigEdit_WormDemotionIsTwoStep(t *testing.T) {
+	d := &InternalDecider{}
+	dec := func(chain zddc.PolicyChain, p zddc.Principal, action string) bool {
+		ok, _ := AllowActionFromChainP(context.Background(), d, chain, p, "/proj/probe", action)
+		return ok
+	}
+	alice := zddc.Principal{Email: "alice@x", Elevated: false} // config-editor, NOT elevated
+
+	// Before — alice administers a WORM zone (admins: + a non-nil worm list).
+	worm := zddc.PolicyChain{
+		Levels:     []zddc.ZddcFile{{Admins: []string{"alice@x"}, Worm: []string{}}},
+		HasAnyFile: true,
+	}
+	// The boundary holds: a direct WORM record write is denied unelevated...
+	if dec(worm, alice, ActionWrite) {
+		t.Error("unelevated config-editor must NOT directly write a WORM record")
+	}
+	// ...but she CAN edit the zone's policy (VerbA) — the lever for demotion.
+	if !dec(worm, alice, ActionAdmin) {
+		t.Error("config-editor should be able to edit the WORM zone's .zddc unelevated")
+	}
+
+	// After — alice has rewritten that .zddc: inherit:false dropped the
+	// embedded worm: and her acl now grants rwcd (the post-edit cascade the
+	// file API persists). The subtree is no longer WORM, so her write lands —
+	// still unelevated. This is step two of the intended demotion.
+	demoted := zddc.PolicyChain{
+		Levels:     []zddc.ZddcFile{{ACL: zddc.ACLRules{Permissions: map[string]string{"alice@x": "rwcd"}}}},
+		HasAnyFile: true,
+	}
+	if !dec(demoted, alice, ActionWrite) {
+		t.Error("after the config-editor demotes the zone, the ordinary write should be allowed")
+	}
+}